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ABSTRACT 
 
Merjanski, Kiril Valtchev. M.A., Department of History, Wright State University, 2006. 
The Secret Serbian-Bulgarian Treaty of Alliance of 1904 and the Russian Policy in the 
Balkans before the Bosnian Crisis. 
 
The two Serbian-Bulgarian treaties, concluded simultaneously in 1904, and known in the 
literature under the common name of “The Secret-Serbian-Bulgarian Treaty of Alliance 
of 1904” are the specific topic of this thesis. These treaties between the Kingdom of 
Serbia and the Principality of Bulgaria contained political, military and economic 
provisions aimed not only against the Ottoman Empire (a common rival of both 
countries), but also against Austria-Hungary. A significant feature of these treaties was 
their obvious pro-Russian orientation, shaped in provisions like unification of the 
telegraphic systems of both countries with that of Russia as well as the requirement for 
Russian arbitration between Bulgaria and Serbia if they were not able to reach agreement 
about the partition of the European possessions of the Ottoman Empire by themselves. 
Considering all this, with some of their provisions the Serbian-Bulgarian Treaties of 1904 
resembled in many ways the Treaty of 1912 between the above-mentioned Balkan 
countries, which became the backbone of the creation of the Balkan League. The creation 
of the latter, on the other hand, was a significant step toward the breakdown of 
equilibrium in Eastern Europe, eventually leading to the outbreak of the First Balkan 
War, with its well known larger consequences. 
Seen in this light, the significance of the Serbian-Bulgarian Treaties of 1904 could be 
defined also as evidence that the Russian policy of creating alliances between the small 
Balkan Slav States, aimed not only against the Ottoman Empire, but also against Austria-
Hungary, and, in this way, “encircling” the latter, could be dated from before the Bosnian 
Crisis (1908), as opposed to the prevailing attitude in the existing literature, that the 
Bosnian Crisis itself was the turning point of Russian foreign policy in this direction. 
Analyzing the military and other clauses of the Serbian-Bulgarian Treaties of 1904, their 
secret character, and the role of some Bulgarian statesmen, politicians and diplomats 
(especially of the Bulgarian Prince Ferdinand I), this thesis seeks to reveal how their 
successful negotiation was ever possible, in spite of the fact that in 1904 Bulgaria was 
ruled by the People’s Liberal Party, a party with a pro-Austrian orientation. This 
orientation was clearly in opposition to a close rapprochement with the new pro-Russian, 
internationally isolated Serbian regime, established with a very bloody coup d’etat in 
1903.  
In revealing this, this thesis also seeks to define the ways by which the Bulgarian and 
Serbian Foreign policies were subjected to those of Russia even at the time, when, 
because of its disastrous engagement in the Far East, the Russian Empire was seemingly 
abandoning its active policy in the Balkans.  
Initiated by the Bulgarian Prince Ferdinand and conducted by means of secret diplomacy 
by some Bulgarian and Serbian politicians, diplomats and military men with firm Pan-
Slavic affiliations, this pro-Russian Serbian-Bulgarian rapprochement allowed not only 
the conclusion of the secret treaties of 1904, but eventually proved to be disastrous for the 
European peace.  
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I. SERBIAN-BULGARIAN RELATIONS BEFORE 1904 AND THE 
RUSSIAN POLICY IN THE BALKANS 
 
1. Introduction 
     In the literature devoted to Russia’s role in the 
origins of World War I, the Bosnian Annexation Crisis of 
1908 is usually considered the turning point in Russian 
Balkan policy. Thus, for example, Andrew Rossos, author of 
a major study of Russia’s policy in the Eastern Question, 
argues that it was the Austrian annexation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in 1908 that led Russia to abandon its policy 
of cooperation with the Habsburg Empire in solving the most 
acute problems in the Balkans, and began a new course of 
promoting Balkan alliances directed not only against the 
Ottoman Empire, but also against Austria-Hungary.1    
     Eventually this new course led to the creation of the 
Balkan league, which proved to be a significant step toward 
the breakdown of equilibrium in Eastern Europe and the 
outbreak of the First Balkan War, with its grave 
consequences for the European peace. Here Rossos follows 
the traditional interpretation dating back to Luigi 
Albertini, but also accepted by Edward C. Thaden, Laurence 
                                                 
1 Andrew Rossos, Russia and the Balkans: Inter-Balkan Rivalries and Russian Foreign Policy 1908-1914 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), 5-7. 
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Lafore, F. R. Bridge, D. C. B. Lieven, James Joll, Barbara 
Jelavich, Samuel R. Williamson.2
     Only Sidney Fay, in his magisterial work “The Origins 
of the World War,” suggests that Russia’s adventurism in 
the Balkans began much earlier. As Fay points out,  
it would be a mistake to assume, as most writers 
do, that Russia had abandoned even temporally, 
the consideration of her ambitions in the Near 
East while pressing her imperialist policy in the 
Far East. This misconception arose largely from 
the inspired Russian Press and from misinformed 
persons who believed that the Russian Bear had 
shifted his appetite completely to the plains of 
Manchuria. In reality, though the Tsar and his 
ministers talked of “Port Arthur,” they were at 
the same time thinking of “Constantinople.3  
 
Fay however offered no concrete evidence for his 
speculation.  
     Following the conclusions reached in the course of 
this thesis it could be added to Fay’s observation that 
“the Tsar and his ministers” were also thinking about 
                                                 
2 Luigi Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965), V. I, 92, 132-8, 
221-2, 253, 256, 293-4, 296-7, 300, 303, 306, 310, 364; Edward C. Thaden, Russia and the Balkan Alliance 
of 1912 (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1965), 15-6, 24, 62; Laurence Lafore, 
The Long Fuse: An Interpretation of the Origins of World War I (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 
1965), 104, 144, 151, 163, 167; F. R. Bridge, From Sadowa to Sarajevo: The Foreign Policy of Austria-
Hungary 1866-1914 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972), 301, 306, 308-309; D. C. B. Lieven, Russia 
and the Origins of the First World War (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983), 33, 34, 36, 39, 40-1; James 
Joll, The Origins of The First World War (London: Longman, 1984), 46, 47; Barbara Jelavich, Russia’s 
Balkan Entanglements 1806-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 210, 224-5, 228; 
Samuel R. Williamson Jr., Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1991), 59, 68, 69, 70, 72, 74-5, 78, 80, 104; and indeed leading Russian diplomats have 
argued in their memoirs that it was precisely the Bosnian crisis that definitively unveiled the expansionist 
Austrian policy in the region, and it was only after this crisis that Russia publicly abandoned its entente 
with Austria-Hungary; this entente manifested in the so called Murzsteg program for reforms of 1903, was 
thus destroyed by the Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina: See Serge Sazonov, Faithful Years, 
(London: Jonathan Cape, 1928), 14, 15, 19, 61; N. V. Tcharikow, Glimpses of High Politics (London: 
George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1931), 269-71. 
3 Sidney B. Fay, The Origins of the World War (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1928), 365. 
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“Krakow and Sarajevo” in the same context as about 
“Constantinople” i.e. not only about the destruction of the 
Ottoman, but of the Habsburg Empire as well. 
     If most scholars have viewed the Bosnian Annexation 
Crisis as the turning point in Russia’s Balkan policy, it 
is because they have generally viewed Balkan affairs 
through the Great Powers’ prisms. A new understanding of 
Russia’s Balkan policy requires us to view this problem 
from the prospective of the Balkan states themselves and 
also, and even more important, to view this problem from 
the perspective of Russia’s policy toward the Balkan states 
in particular. This is why detailed studies of Russian 
policy towards the Slav Balkan states, especially Bulgaria 
and Serbia, are necessary. 
     The present study addresses both of these problems 
through the neglected source, the memoirs of the Bulgarian 
diplomat Christophor Khesapchiev.4 Khesapchiev’s memoirs are 
especially valuable as a neglected source for Serbian-
Bulgarian relations in the early 20th century, and 
Khesapchiev is absolutely essential for a behind the scenes 
view of the negotiations leading to the Serbian-Bulgarian 
treaties of 1904. As a trusted personal confidante of the 
                                                 
4 Христофор Хесапчиев, Служба на България в чужбина: Военнодипломатически спомени 1899-
1914 г. (София: Военноиздателски комплекс Св. Георги Победоносец, 1993). 
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Bulgarian Prince Ferdinand, and as the actual negotiator on 
the scene, Khesapchiev was privy to all phases of the 
Serbian-Bulgarian rapprochement of 1904-1905. Secondly, he 
supports his memoirs with documents from an extremely well-
preserved and complete personal archive supplemented by 
detailed day-to-day diaries.5 Khesapchiev’s archive was much 
more complete on these negotiations than that of the 
Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, because, at the 
beginning of negotiations, the Bulgarian Prime Minister 
Racho Petrov had ordered that all relevant diplomatic 
correspondence, both Bulgarian and Serbian, be routed only 
to himself and Khesapchiev, thus leaving the Bulgarian 
Foreign Ministry uninformed.6 By publishing his secret 
correspondence with P.M. Petrov, Khesapchiev made available 
not only the final versions of the treaties, but also their 
preliminary drafts, thus illuminating all stages of the 
negotiations. It should also be added that Khesapchiev’s 
dealings with the Great Powers’ diplomatic representatives 
in Belgrade, included in his memoirs, also shed additional 
                                                 
5 Хесапчиев, Служба на България, 26. 
6 Хесапчиев, Служба на България, 13; Toshev, who published for first time The Treaty of Alliance in 
1929 especially points out that the treaties in question were given to him by General Racho Petrov, instead 
of taking them from the Archives of the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry, where they were not presented  See 
Андрей Тошев, Балканските войни (София: Факел, 1929), Т. I, 153. 
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light on the Balkan policies of the Great Powers during 
this period.7
     The present thesis argues that the Bosnian Annexation 
Crisis, while an important event in Europe in the first 
decade of the twentieth century, was not the turning point 
in Russia’s Balkan policy. In fact behind the façade of 
official cooperation with Austria-Hungary Russia was 
actually pursuing anti-Austrian alliances with the major 
Balkan powers as early as 1896. 
     This anti-Austrian polices can be most clearly seen in 
the secret Serbian-Bulgarian rapprochement of 1904 in which 
Russia played a covert yet decisive role.      
 
2. Russo-Bulgarian Relations 1878-1896 
     The independent Bulgarian state came into existence in 
1878 after the Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878) and the 
Congress of Berlin (1878). Despite Russia’s claim to 
portray herself as liberator of Bulgaria, the Russo-
Bulgarian relations deteriorated rapidly after Russia 
refused to recognize the Bulgarian Unification of 1885. 
This conflict between Russia and the newly united Bulgarian 
Principality led to active Russian intervention in 
                                                 
7 It would not be an exaggeration to say that Khesapchiev’s memoirs are still virtually unexplored by the 
contemporary historians writing on the topic; this can be explained from the fact that the memoirs were not 
published until 1993.  
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Bulgarian affairs, and culminated with the abdication of 
Prince Alexander Battenberg. 
     Soon after the election of the new Bulgarian Prince 
Ferdinand von Saxe-Coburg-Gotha in 1887, Russo-Bulgarian 
relations reached their nadir. Russo-Bulgarian diplomatic 
relations broke down and would not be resumed until 1896. 
     After the death of the Russian Tsar Alexander III in 
1894, and the fall of Stambolov’s Russophobe government in 
Bulgaria, there were favorable conditions not only for 
renewing diplomatic relations between Bulgaria and Russia, 
but also for their rapid improvement. Indeed the initiative 
for a Russo-Bulgarian rapprochement came from no less an 
authority than the Bulgarian Monarch, Prince Ferdinand. 
     The ill-fated experience of his predecessor on the 
Bulgarian throne had made it clear to Ferdinand that, 
without winning Russian approval and support, he could not 
hope to remain ruler of Bulgaria.8 Moreover, without Russian 
support, his recognition as legitimate Bulgarian monarch 
was also impossible, since Russia could block his 
recognition by the Ottoman Sultan, Ferdinand’s formal 
suzerain.  
     Following his ambition not only to secure the 
Bulgarian throne for himself, but also to secure the future 
                                                 
8 Stefan Groueff, Crown of Thorns (London: Madison Press, 1987), 25. 
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of his newly founded dynasty, Ferdinand took a second 
decisive step in winning Russian support. In 1896 he 
christened his first-born son Boris (the successor to the 
Bulgarian throne) in the Christian Orthodox faith. For this 
decisive step, Ferdinand, himself a Catholic, was 
excommunicated by Pope Leo XIII, but he nevertheless 
achieved his main political goal, and also gained Russian 
approval. Ferdinand was thereby recognized as legitimate 
Bulgarian prince by the Russian Tsar and the Ottoman 
Sultan, but also won the approval of the Bulgarian Orthodox 
Church, which had earlier opposed his reign. As a gesture 
showing the importance of Russia’s relations with Bulgaria, 
the new Russian Emperor Nicholas II even agreed to become 
Boris’ godfather, marking in this way a new beginning in 
Russian-Bulgarian relations.9
     Along with the rapid improvement of the Russo-
Bulgarian relations in 1896 the Russian diplomacy made the 
first step for initiating an alliance between the Slav 
Balkan states i.e. Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro. The 
initial push came from the Russian ambassador in 
Constantinople Alexander Nelidov, who in several meetings 
with Mitar Bakic, the Montenegrin ambassador in 
                                                 
9 Георги Тодоров, “Обезглавената монархия”, Култура, no. 18 (2001); Андрей Тошев, Балканските 
войни, Т. I, 96-7. 
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Constantinople, proposed that Montenegro take the 
initiative in forming such an alliance.10    
     According to the Bulgarian diplomat Andrej Toshev, who 
witnessed these events in his role as ambassador to 
Macedonia, Montenegro, and later Serbia, soon after the 
improvement of Russian-Bulgarian relations, Russian 
diplomats in Sofia and Belgrade began working for an 
alliance between Serbia and Bulgaria.11
 
3. The Macedonian Question 
     A Serbian-Bulgarian Alliance at that time was much 
easier to imagine than achieve. The main barrier was the 
fate of Macedonia, which was still under Ottoman rule. Both 
Serbia and Bulgaria wanted an end to Ottoman rule, but 
their visions about the future of Macedonia were in sharp 
contrast. Viewing Macedonians as Bulgarians, Bulgarian 
political circles and political opinion favored full 
autonomy of Macedonia as a preliminary step towards future 
unification with Bulgaria, in the same way that unification 
between Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia in 1885 had been 
                                                 
10 Радослав Попов, Балканската политика на България (София: Издателство на Българската 
академия на науките, 1984), 107.  
11 Андрей Тошев, Балканските войни, Т. I, 97. 
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achieved.12 Opposing this Bulgarian view was the Serbian 
vision, which favored a partition of Macedonia between 
Serbia and Bulgaria. 
     The Bulgarian viewpoint on this question was largely a 
reaction to the activities of the Internal Macedonian-
Odrian Revolutionary Organization (IMORO) created in 1893.13 
IMORO’s terrorist tactics had alienated these Bulgarian 
politicians who might otherwise have favored a partition of 
Macedonia between Serbia and Bulgaria. It is also well 
known from some of his conversations and remarks that the 
Bulgarian Prince (later Tsar) Ferdinand was also afraid of 
IMORO, and thus extremely cautious in dealing with 
Macedonia.14
     Another controversy that poisoned relations between 
Serbia and Bulgaria was the existence of the Bulgarian 
Exarchate. Created in 1870, the Bulgarian Exarchate was the 
Bulgarian National Church, which had long been separated 
from the patriarchate of Constantinople. Embracing most of 
Macedonia, the Bulgarian Exarchate served as promoter of 
                                                 
12 Димитър Г. Гоцев, Идеята за автономия като тактика в програмите на национално 
освободителното движение в Македония и Одринско 1893-1941 (София: Издателство на 
Българската академия на науките, 1983), 19-20. 
13 The epithet Odrian came from the Bulgarian name of Adrianople – Odrin, and indicated that IMORO 
was fighting for liberation of the Bulgarians within the Ottoman Empire not only in Macedonia, but also in 
Eastern Thrace. About the leaders of IMORO (such as Gotse Delchev, Dame Gruev and others) and their 
support for the autonomy of Macedonia as preliminary step towards unification with Bulgaria See 
Димитър Г. Гоцев, Идеята за автономия като тактика в програмата на национално 
освободителното движение в Македония и Одринско 1893-1941, 17-9.   
14 Eric Helmreich, The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1938), 51. 
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the Bulgarian cause, facilitating the creation of a 
substantial number of Bulgarian schools where pupils 
studied the language, history and culture of Bulgaria. In 
fact, most of the founders and the leaders of IMORO were 
former teachers from those schools. To neutralize the 
influence of the Bulgarian Exarchate, the Serbian state 
relentlessly promoted Serbian priests in Macedonia, thus 
creating opposition from the Bulgarian government, Church, 
and also IMORO. 
     Given these obstacles hindering a strong alliance 
between Serbia and Bulgaria, a reconciliation of almost 
irreconcilable factors was necessary. The most important of 
these factors were as follows:  
1. a mutually satisfactory solution to the Macedonian 
Question  
2. overcoming the resistance of IMORO for a future 
compromise on this matter  
3. given the importance of Russian mediation, the 
establishment of Russophile governments in the both 
countries. 
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4. The Serbian-Bulgarian Rapprochement 1896-1987 and the 
Russian Policy in the Balkans 
     By 1896 some of the factors favoring a Serbian-
Bulgarian Alliance were already in place. According to 
Andrej Toshev, Russian diplomats had begun to press the 
Bulgarian government to improve its relations with Serbia. 
Russia appears to have pursued the same policy toward 
Serbia, where at that moment the government led by Joka 
Simich also favored closer ties with the Russian Empire.  
     It is therefore not surprising that 1896 was the 
pivotal year for a new Serbian-Bulgarian rapprochement 
after decades of hostile relations. The role of Russian 
diplomacy in this process is clearly described in the 
memoirs of the secretary of the Bulgarian Exarchate Atanas 
Shopov (a Russophile himself), who in 1896 visited St. 
Petersburg for series of meetings with the Russian foreign 
minister Count Lobanov-Rostovskii. According to Shopov,  
The designs of Russian diplomacy for a close 
Serbian-Bulgarian rapprochement became more 
evident after the recognition of Prince Ferdinand 
and the anointing of the Crown-Prince Boris. 
Along with the other questions, discussed at that 
time, there were talks about a future Serbian-
Bulgarian rapprochement and about setting aside 
the Schism.15 It was made clear to us that 
                                                 
15 The schism in question between the patriachate of Constantinople and the Bulgarian Exarchate became 
fact in 1872 i.e. two years after the creation of the Bulgarian Exarchate in 1870: See Радослав Попов, 
Балканската политика на България 1894-1898, 15. 
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Bulgaria must follow the Russian policy in the 
East about all questions.16
  
     During A. Shopov’s conversations with the Russian 
foreign minister, the latter also insisted, that for 
improving its relations with Serbia, the Bulgarian 
government should relocate the head of Bulgarian Exarchate 
Joseph from Constantinople to Sofia, leaving Macedonian 
churches to the patriarchate of Constantinople.  
     As already noted, the growing influence of the 
Bulgarian Exarchate in Macedonia was one of the barriers 
for the improvement of the Serbian-Bulgarian relations, so 
it was clear that in this question, Russian diplomacy had 
sided with Serbia, while pressing Bulgaria for compromise 
as a way for removing the existing barriers to a future 
Serbian-Bulgarian Alliance. Moreover, according to Shopov, 
Lobanov-Rostovskii made it clear to him that Russia saw the 
resolution of these religious Serbian-Bulgarian 
contradictions as a necessary condition for achieving a 
future Serbian-Bulgarian Alliance.17 But even for the most 
radical Russophiles in the Bulgarian government, this 
compromise was too great. It was also unacceptable to 
Bulgarian public opinion. There was also the danger of a 
violent reaction from IMORO.  
                                                 
16 Атанас Шопов, “Сръбско-български сфери на влияние в Македония”, Миръ, no. 4165-5-7 и 8 
(1925). 
17 Атанас Шопов, “Сръбско-български сфери на влияние в Македония”, no. 4165. 
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     Although the Bulgarian government rejected the Russian 
proposal to limit the influence of the Bulgarian Church in 
Macedonia, it nevertheless consented to a lesser 
compromise: to try to persuade the Bulgarian Exarchate to 
allow Serbian priests in Macedonia and to allow a Serbian 
Exarchate there. Soon an agreement was reached on this 
matter between the Serbian and Bulgarian governments and, 
following this agreement in 1896, the Bulgarian ambassador 
in Constantinople, accompanied by the secretary of the 
Serbian embassy, met with the head of the Bulgarian 
Exarchate, asking him to permit a Serbian Exarchate in 
Kumanovo.18 This proposal was firmly rejected by the head of 
the Bulgarian Church, Joseph I, who was independent of the 
Bulgarian government. As we shall see later in this thesis, 
Russian diplomacy would continue to work for the admission 
of Serbian priests in Macedonia, and using its influence in 
a later Russophile Bulgarian government (led by Stojan 
Danev) would succeed in this in 1902.19
     As already noted, 1896 marked a new beginning in 
relations between Serbia and Bulgaria. On 25 March, almost 
immediately after his recognition as legitimate Bulgarian 
Prince, Ferdinand arrived in Belgrade, accompanied by the 
                                                 
18 Андрей Тошев, Балканските войни, Т. I, 119. 
19 Of all Bulgarian politicians Danev was the most extreme Russophile See Richard C. Hall, Bulgaria’s 
Road to the First World War (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1996), 11. 
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Prime-Minister Konstantin Stoilov and the Military Minister 
General Racho Petrov. Met with a great pomp by the Serbian 
king Alexander, his ministers and the leaders of the 
Serbian clergy, Prince Ferdinand also attended a solemn 
church service conducted by the Serbian metropolitan 
Michael “for the well-being of the Russian Tsar, the 
Serbian King and of the Princes of Bulgaria and 
Montenegro.”20  
     After Ferdinand’s visit in Belgrade, the improvement 
of the Serbian-Bulgarian relations accelerated. This 
improvement took shape in exchange of delegations, 
consisting members of the Serbian and Bulgarian 
Parliaments, military officers, merchants, clerks, 
journalists, clergymen and students. On 10 May 1896 a 
special train arrived in Sofia with a delegation of one 
thousand Serbian statesmen, scientists, journalists, 
clergymen and other important persons, who came for the 
specially organized Serbian-Bulgarian celebrations. The 
dates of this celebration were deliberately chosen to 
coincide with the coronation of Nicholas II in Moscow on 14 
May. These Serbian-Bulgarian activities were accompanied by 
campaigns in the Serbian and Bulgarian presses, praising 
the friendship of these two “brotherly Slav nations.” 
                                                 
20 Андрей Тошев, Балканските войни, Т. I, 98. 
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During this campaign, the person of the Russian Tsar was 
also often pointed out as guarantor for the durability of 
this new rapprochement.21   
     Returning Ferdinand’s visit, on 17 February 1897 King 
Alexander visited Sofia accompanied by the Serbian Prime-
minister Simich and the financial minister Vujch. During 
this visit a Trade Treaty was signed and to be underlined 
that this visit had also meaning of a preliminary step to a 
future military cooperation, the Serbian King watched 
exercises, performed by some units of the Bulgarian army in 
the company of Prince Ferdinand. This visit furthered the 
Serbian-Bulgarian rapprochement, which continued to the 
very end of 1897.22
     But a more formidable barrier for future political and 
military alliance between the two countries was the 
Macedonian Question. This was the sine qua non for 
conclusion of a real political and military alliance 
between Serbia and Bulgaria. Fifteen years later (in 1912) 
the creation of the Balkan League under Russian assistance, 
became possible only because the Russophile Bulgarian 
government led by Ivan Gueshoff, agreed to divide Macedonia 
with Serbia.23  
                                                 
21 Тошев, Балканските, Т. I, 98-9. 
22 Тошев, Балканските, Т. I, 101-3. 
23 Ivan Gueshoff, The Balkan League (London [no publisher is identified], 1915), 14. 
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     It is an interesting coincidence (if indeed a 
coincidence), that the Bulgarian russophile government, led 
by Constantin Stoilov during the Serbian-Bulgarian 
rapprochement in 1896-97, was also inclined to do this.24 
The evidence is difficult to find, because the negotiations 
on that matter between the Serbian and Bulgarian 
governments were held in deep secrecy. The main reasons for 
this secrecy were the fierce rejection at that time by 
Bulgarian public opinion of any possible compromises 
concerning the Macedonian cause, and the fear of reprisal 
by the Macedonian revolutionaries, who were ready to oppose 
with any possible means the partition of their country. 
This fear appeared to be not unfounded. When in 1897, 
rumors circulated that the Bulgarian government was 
preparing the partition of Macedonia, Prime-Minister 
Stoilov began to receive anonymous threats that he and his 
ministers “will pay with their blood, if they allow this 
treachery to happen.”25   
     Realizing the seriousness of the situation for his 
government and for him personally, Stoilov declared 
publicly in the Bulgarian Parliament on 13 December 1897, 
that the Bulgarian government under his leadership had 
                                                 
24 During the period between 1894 and 1899 Ivan Gueshoff was also minister in Stoilov’s government. 
25 Андрей Тошев, Балканските войни, Т. I, 104-5. 
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never intended to divide Macedonia into spheres of 
influence between Serbia and Bulgaria.26 But a closer 
examination of the Serbian-Bulgarian negotiations in this 
period reveals that such negotiations were in fact in 
progress.  
     In 1897, according to Ljubomir Jovanovich, a Serbian 
statesman from this period, the representatives of the 
Bulgarian government had begun talks with their Serbian 
colleagues over the future partition of Macedonia between 
Serbia and Bulgaria.27 In connection with this, the 
recollections of the Bulgarian diplomat Hristo Brakalov are 
also very important. When, in 1899, he arrived as new 
Bulgarian ambassador in Belgrade, in his first meeting with 
the Serbian King Alexander he was extremely surprised to 
hear the following: 
You are probably informed – the King said - about 
the negotiations, which for two years are in 
progress between Serbia and Bulgaria for a closer 
rapprochement between these two brotherly 
countries. The most difficult question has always 
been the Macedonian question. But for solving 
this question we came to a satisfactory agreement 
two years ago during my visit in Sofia. In 
Macedonia we have vital interests as you 
Bulgarians have vital interests there. What is 
left is to define exactly our spheres of 
influence in this Ottoman province. With the 
government of Mr. Stoilov the negotiations about 
this matter made very good progress. I believe 
                                                 
26 Тошев, Балканските, Т. I, 105.  
27 Љубомир Jовановић, “О Староj Србиjи и маћедонској аутономији”, Дело IX, no. 31, (1904): 27. 
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that it will be the same with the new Bulgarian 
government, because this is the only way for 
establishing of close and unbreakable alliance 
between Bulgaria and Serbia. 
 
     Brakalov was surprised by the words of the Serbian 
king, because he was a representative of the pro-Austrian 
Bulgarian government that had come to power in Bulgaria in 
1899, and was therefore privy to the secrets of the 
previous Russophile government of Konstantin Stoilov. Thus 
the Bulgarian ambassador could only reply that he knew 
nothing about all this, but would check with the Bulgarian 
Foreign Ministry about written agreements between the 
Serbian and Bulgarian governments concerning this matter. 
After a search conducted by Bulgarian foreign minister 
Todor Ivanchov, no documents of this kind were found in the 
Bulgarian Foreign Ministry, but oddly enough, a map of 
Macedonia was found with blue and red lines on it, defining 
the regions of Bulgarian and Serbian “spheres of 
interests.” To deepen the mystery surrounding these 
Serbian-Bulgarian negotiations in 1897, this map was found 
not in the archives of the Bulgarian foreign ministry, but 
had come either from the palace of Prince Ferdinand, or 
from the Bulgarian Ministry of War.28  
                                                 
28 Андрей Тошев, Балканските войни, Т. I, 105-7. 
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     The information that Prince Ferdinand was personally 
involved in the negotiations for partition of Macedonia as 
necessary step for achieving a strong alliance with Serbia 
deserves special attention.29 Later he would play a leading 
role in the conclusion of the secret Serbian-Bulgarian 
Alliance of 1904. Ferdinand’s role would be also decisive, 
although hidden, in the creation of the Balkan League, 
calling to power in 1911 precisely these Russophile 
parties, which with the assistance of the Russian diplomacy 
would accomplish the creation of the League. 
     At the same time that it secretly facilitated and 
encouraged a Serbian-Bulgarian rapprochement in 1897, 
official Russian policy was oriented toward keeping 
friendly relations with Austria-Hungry. Concerning the 
Balkans these relations were oriented toward maintaining 
the status quo in the region and the division of the 
Russian and Austrian spheres of influence there.30 In April 
1897 the Austrian Emperor Franz Josef visited St. 
Petersburg. During this visit a secret agreement was 
elaborated for future collaboration between the two empires 
                                                 
29 Even if we prefer to accept the information that the map in question was found in the Ministry of War as 
the real one, this does not minimize the personal involvement of Ferdinand in the negotiations about the 
partition of Macedonia at least for two reasons: first, Ferdinand was supreme commander of the Bulgarian 
army, so the negotiations of that caliber possibly led by the Bulgarian militaries could not be conduct 
without his knowledge and second, the military minister at that time was General Racho Petrov, who was 
one of the most faithful and confident servants of Ferdinand in the Bulgarian political life. 
30 Андрей Тошев, Балканските войни, Т. I, 113-4. 
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in the Balkans, based on the definition of their spheres of 
interests. Possibly aware of the recent Serbian polices in 
South and Eastern direction and its attempts for creating a 
strong alliance with Bulgaria, during Franz Josef’s visit 
in St. Petersburg, Austrian diplomacy secured the future 
creation of Albania in case of termination of the Ottoman 
possessions in eastern Europe, denying in this way a future 
access of Serbia to the Adriatic coast.31 As a consequence 
of this secret agreement between the Russian and the 
Habsburg empires, on 29 April 1897 the Russian and the 
Austrian governments issued two simultaneous diplomatic 
communiqués. Rejecting any possible changes in the status 
quo in the Balkans, Russia and Austro-Hungry declared that 
they would continue to promote reforms in Macedonia. The 
main addressees of these communiqués were the governments 
of Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro.32  
     But despite its official position, the Russian 
government tacitly encouraged Serbia and Bulgaria to reach 
an agreement aimed at altering the status quo in the 
region. It is worth reiterating here that the initial push 
for this Serbian-Bulgarian rapprochement was given by 
Russian diplomacy in 1896, and that throughout 1897, the 
                                                 
31 Barbara Jelavich, Russia’s Balkan Entanglements, 212. 
32 Андрей Тошев, Балканските войни, Т. I, 114. 
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figure of the Russian Tsar continued to be considered by 
both countries as guarantor for this rapprochement.       
     There is yet another important detail. In 1897, the 
Russian ambassador in Belgrade was the future foreign 
minister A.P. Izvolskii. When Izvolskii became Russian 
foreign minister in 1906, he infused new dynamic into 
Russian foreign policy. Openly changing Russia’s foreign 
priorities and pursuing alliances in Europe Izvolskii 
played an important role in Anglo-Russian rapprochement of 
1907 thus laying the foundation for the Triple Entente. 
     In his Balkan policy, Izvolskii sought to create 
military alliances between the small Balkan Slav States.33 
These were aimed at Austria-Hungary, and against German 
influence in general, and there is evidence that this 
policy began before the Bosnian Crisis. Thus, for example 
in his first meeting with Sergeev, the Russian ambassador 
in Belgrade (Feb. 1908), it became clear to Toshev, the 
Bulgarian ambassador that “the Russian diplomacy wanted at 
any costs to ally Serbia, Bulgaria and Montenegro, and to 
have them at its side in a future big war against 
Germanism.”34 To all this could be added also the fact, that 
Izvolski was also very sympathetic to Neoslavism, a mainly 
                                                 
33 Христофор Хесапчиев, Служба на България в чужбина, 444. 
34 Андрей Тошев, Балканските войни, Т. I, 177.  
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Russian intellectual and political movement, which 
considered Slavs in the Hapsburg and the Ottoman empire 
living under a “yoke,” that should be terminated by the 
breakup of these empires.35  
     All these considerations hint at the possibility of 
Izvolskii’s more active role in the Serbian-Bulgarian 
rapprochement in 1897. Some historians have argued that 
Izvolskii spent the major part of his career as ambassador 
in western Europe, and was therefore not familiar with 
Balkan politics.36 But a closer look at Izvolskii’s 
diplomatic career reveals that he spent substantial time in 
the Balkan embassies. He had started his diplomatic career 
as secretary to the future foreign minister Lobanov-
Rostovskii, during the latter’s service as Russian 
ambassador in Constantinople. Before becoming ambassador in 
Belgrade, Izvolskii had also served as first-secretary in 
the Russian embassy in Bucharest.37
 
 
                                                 
35 For Neo Slavism See Barbara Jelavich, Russia’s Balkan Entanglements, 208-10; about the difference 
between conservative Pan Slavism and liberal Neo Slavism See James Joll, The Origins of The First World 
War, 105-6. 
36 Barbara Jelavich, Russia’s Balkan Entanglements, 217. 
37 Whatever the truth, the author of this thesis still does not posses any information about Izvolskii’s 
activity as Russian ambassador in Belgrade, except the fact that he was recalled from Belgrade, when he 
too vehemently for a diplomat protested about the change of Serbian policy from pro-Russian to pro-
Austrian in October 1897: Seе Радослав Попов, Балканската политика на България, 207. 
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5. The Decline of the Serbian-Bulgarian Rapprochement after 
October 1897 
     By late 1897, the Serbian-Bulgarian rapprochement, 
initiated by Russian diplomacy, had reached a dead end. The 
main reason for this was the political change in Belgrade, 
where a new government came to power with a clearly pro-
Austrian orientation. Whereas Bulgaria until 1899 was ruled 
by the same Russophile government, led by the People’s 
Party of Konstantin Stoilov, which under the Russian 
influence even made the first steps toward a future 
partition of Macedonia, the new Serbian government, led by 
Dr. Vladan Georgevich, preferred to seek rapprochement with 
the Ottoman Empire against Bulgaria.38 One of the reasons 
for this was the growing tension in Macedonia, where IMORO 
became more active especially in 1897-98, supplanting in 
many regions Ottoman power with its own. Given the fact 
that IMORO was sponsored by and had its bases solely in 
Bulgaria, where armed bands were formed for trespassing 
into the Ottoman parts of Macedonia, the new Serbian 
government viewed exactly Bulgaria as the biggest threat to 
the Serbian influence there.  
     When, in 1899, the Bulgarian Liberal Party, a party 
with anti-Russian orientation, replaced Stoilov’s 
                                                 
38 Андрей Тошев, Балканските войни, Т. I, 116. 
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Russophile government, the possibility of a Serbian-
Bulgarian alliance became even more remote. This 
development, moreover, coincided with the shifting of the 
focus of the Russian foreign policy to the Far East, where 
it became more and more evident that Russia would have to 
fight a war with Japan. To secure its rear, official 
Russian diplomacy continued to be cautious toward Austria-
Hungary, following the policy from 1897.  
     This new Far Asian direction of Russian diplomacy 
coincided with the appointment of Count Lamzdorf as Russian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. Lamzdorf, a cautious diplomat, 
continued a Russian policy balanced between Germany, 
Austria-Hungary and France. At the end of 1902, Lamzdorf 
also visited Sofia and Belgrade to calm Bulgarian and 
Serbian agitation over recent developments in Macedonia.39 
But Lamzdorf also warned them not to rely on Russian help 
in a future conflict. To secure Austrian neutrality in the 
coming war with Japan, Lamzdorf also visited Vienna, where, 
with his Austrian counterpart Goluchowsky, he elaborated a 
program of reforms to damper the escalating tension in 
Macedonia.  
     But in spite of these reforms and the warnings of the 
Bulgarian government that it could not be involved 
                                                 
39 Тошев, Балканските, Т. I, 122-3. 
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officially in future disturbances in Macedonia, a revolt, 
led by IMORO, finally broke out there in 1903. This 
immediately worsened relations between Bulgaria and the 
Ottoman Empire, both of whom saw the other as the real 
instigator of the uprising. 
     In accordance with its official policy of promoting 
reforms in cooperation with Austria-Hungary, Russia, in a 
special communiqué from 11 April 1903, had already publicly 
condemned IMORO as organization acting against the 
interests of the Christian Balkan peoples, and had accused 
it of seeking to convert Macedonia into a solely Bulgarian 
land.40 The last statement could be pointed out as 
representative for the Russian Macedonian policy in 
general, according to which Macedonia was first and 
foremost a land populated by Eastern Orthodox Slavs, and 
after that by different nationalities. 
     Following this policy, even during the years between 
1898-1900, when Serbia was generally pro-Austrian, Russian 
diplomacy continued to work for promoting Serbian priests 
as leaders of the local churches in Macedonia, a policy 
that, according to all accounts, was extremely unpopular 
                                                 
40 Тошев, Балканските, Т. I, 123-4. 
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among the local population, and needless to say, among the 
leaders and members of IMORO.41
     Practical expression of this policy was the 
appointment of the Serbian priest Firmilian as bishop of 
Scopje in 1902, an event that caused significant agitation 
not only among the local Macedonians, but also in public 
opinion in Bulgaria.  
     This appointment was achieved with the relentless 
efforts of Russian diplomacy for a period of about five 
years, from 1897 to 1902, when at last Firmilian received a 
berat for the bishopric of Scopije.42 This proved to be 
possible, when again in 1902, a Russophile government, led 
by Stojan Danev, came on power in Bulgaria. It was not 
surprising, if we keep in mind that in 1896 another 
Russophile Bulgarian government, following Russian advise, 
was ready for compromise on this matter.   
     But for Balkan relations, the appointment of Firmilian 
is also important in another light. During the agitation in 
Bulgaria caused by this appointment, the idea of a future 
alliance between Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro was first 
articulated publicly. This is even more significant because 
it was made by a Bulgarian politician and diplomat, who 
                                                 
41 Александр Амфитеатров, В моих скитаниях: Балканские впечатления (Райская: СПб, 1903), 97-8. 
42Berat – special charter issued by Ottoman Sultan allowing the Orthodox priests within the Ottoman 
Empire to occupy their sees. Андрей Тошев, Балканските войни, Т. I, 118-22. 
 
 27
later would play a very important role, not only in the 
conclusion of the secret Serbian-Bulgarian Alliance of 
1904, but also eight years later in the formation of the 
Balkan League. The name of this person is Dimitar Rizov. 
     Later in this thesis Rizov’s political and diplomatic 
activities will be scrutinized in a more detailed way, but 
for now it is worth noting that in 1902 he was one of the 
few Macedonians in Bulgaria to favor the appointment of 
Firmilian as bishop of Skopije.43 During a protest meeting 
against Firmilian’s appointment at Sofia University, Rizov 
alone defended Firmilian’s appointment, and for the first 
time stated publicly that Bulgaria should support this 
appointment for the sake of a future alliance between 
Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro.44  
     The significance of this statement is two fold: first, 
it suggests that the idea of a Proto-Balkan League had 
already existed in 1902 and, second: that this statement 
was made by the future Bulgarian ambassador in Montenegro.45 
In any case, it is clear that Rizov’s views were close to 
those of the Bulgarian Prince Ferdinand, who decided most 
appointments of Bulgarian diplomats. Had Ferdinand opposed 
                                                 
43 See pp. 49-54 of this thesis. 
44 Андрей Тошев, Балканските войни, Т. I, 122. 
45 Soon after this public statement Rizov was sent in the Montenegrin capital Cetine as Bulgarian 
diplomatic agent. 
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Rizov’s views, he would not have chosen him for the 
Montenegrin post. 
     Officially Russia continued to cooperate with Austria-
Hungary in implementing reforms in Macedonia, and these 
reforms, more radical than those elaborated by Lamzdorf and 
Goluchowsky in February 1903, became evident when in the 
summer of the same year, the revolt broke out in Macedonia, 
leaving about 4,700 dead and 71,000 forced, to emigrate to 
Bulgaria. In response to these new Ottoman massacres, 
Russia and Austria-Hungary jointly introduced a new program 
of reforms, known as the Murzsteg program, named after the 
Austrian town where Nicholas II met with Franz-Joseph in 
Sept. 1903. According to this new program, an international 
commission was formed for preventing new atrocities against 
the Christian population in Macedonia and appointing 
foreign military officers for supervising and reforming the 
Turkish gendarmerie.46  
     But for the political situation in the Balkans, 1903 
was significant not for the Murzsteg program (which never 
achieved significant results) but because of the coup that 
toppled the ruling dynasty in Serbia. 
 
 
                                                 
46 Андрей Тошев, Балканските войни, Т. I, 127-30. 
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6. Coup d’etat in Belgrade  
     On the evening of June 11, at midnight, twenty-eight 
Serbian officers and their units surrounded the palace of 
the Serbian king Alexander, disarmed the royal guard and 
cruelly massacred the monarch and his wife Queen Draga.47 On 
the same night, several Serbian ministers were also killed 
in front of their families.48 This coup d’etat replaced not 
only Serbia’s ruling dynasty, but also changed the 
political course of the Serbian government. The new 
dynasty, represented by king Peter Karageorgevich, returned 
power to the Old Radical Party, which would rule unopposed 
for decades to come. This party favored a rapprochement 
with Russia, and claimed the Serbian population living 
within the Habsburg Empire as part of Greater Serbia. This 
policy would prove extremely dangerous for the political 
balance in the Eastern Europe, and would ultimately upset 
this balance, thus leading to the outbreak of First World 
War.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
47 The leader of these conspirators was no other than the well known Dragutin Dimitrievic (Apis), the 
organizer of the Sarajevo assassinations: See David MacKenzie, Serbs and Russians (Boulder: East 
European Monographs, 1996), 133-7; 303; 307-8. 
48 Andre Gerolymatos, The Balkan Wars (New York: Perseus Books Group, 2002), 36. 
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II. THE SECRET SERBO-BULGARIAN TREATIES OF 1904 
 
1. Introduction 
     Although the secret alliance concluded between 
Bulgaria and Serbia in 1904 was known to contemporaries 
under the name of “The Serbian-Bulgarian Treaty of Alliance 
of 1904”, there were actually two treaties signed between 
Serbia and Bulgaria on 30 March (12 April – N. S.) 1904.49 
The first was a “Treaty of Friendship” while the second was 
the actual “Treaty of Alliance”.50
     Since both signatories intended for the treaties to 
remain secret in the foreseeable future, there were 
specific articles stipulating that eventual disclosure 
could be undertaken only after preliminary agreement 
between the Serbian and the Bulgarian governments. The 
treaties were also accompanied by a “Concluding Protocol”, 
in which the secret character of the “Treaty of Alliance” 
was again confirmed by a separate clause, stating that 
copies of this treaty be kept only in the personal archives 
of the Serbian and Bulgarian Monarchs (King Peter and 
Prince Ferdinand respectively), and thus forbidding 
                                                 
49 Ivan Gueshoff, The Balkan League (London [no publisher is identified], 1915), 10. 
50 Христофор Хесапчиев, Служба на България в чужбина чужбина: Военнодипломатически 
спомени 1899-1914 г. (София: Военноиздателски комплекс Св. Георги Победоносец, 1993), 101-6; 
Андрей Тошев, Балканските войни (София: Факел, 1929), Т. I, 154 – 5; 156; Ernst Helmreich, The 
Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1938), 464; 466; 468. 
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additional copies to be deposited even in the archives of 
the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the two states.51
     This secrecy reflects not only the covert nature of 
the preliminary negotiations, but also explains why their 
existence remained for so long unknown to the public. The 
“Treaty of Friendship” was only published for the first 
time by the Bolshevik government after the collapse of the 
Tsarist regime in 1918.52 The “Treaty of Alliance” remained 
a secret until 1929, twenty five years after its 
conclusion.53  
     Despite this secrecy, the history of these treaties is 
one of the best documented cases in modern Bulgarian 
diplomacy, primarily because of the detailed account by one 
of the main participants in the negotiations Hristofor 
Khesapchiev, at that time serving as Bulgarian military 
agent in Belgrade.54
 
 
 
                                                 
51 Христофор Хесапчиев, Служба на Българиая в чужбина, 102; 104; 106; Андрей Тошев, 
Балканските войни, 156; 154; See also Appendix, II, 2, p. 104, Article IV. 
52 From the archives of the former Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs as negative example of the Russian 
secretive “imperialistic” diplomacy See in Народный комиссариат по иностранным делам: Сборник 
секретных документов из архива бывшаго минисртества иностранных дел (Петроград: Народный 
комиссариат по иностранным делам, 1917-18), no. 2, 34-5. 
53 Published by the Bulgarian diplomat Andrej Toshev in his memoirs “The Balkan Wars”: Андрей Тошев, 
Балканските войни, 153-5. 
54 Because in 1904 Bulgaria was still a vassal principality of the Ottoman Empire, her representatives 
abroad were called diplomatic and military agents, after declaring the independence of Bulgaria in 1908 
these offices were accordingly transformed into ambassadors and military attachés.    
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2. Background of Alliance 
     Khesapchiev first raised the idea of an alliance 
between Bulgaria and the new Serbian regime during his 
final audience as Bulgarian military agent in Belgrade with 
the new Serbian King Peter Karadjordjevic on 18 January (1 
February – N. S.) 1904.55 During this audience Khesapchiev 
openly told the King that he would like to return to 
Belgrade with “a special mission to work for an agreement 
between our brotherly (i.e. Bulgarian and Serbian) 
peoples.”  
     This statement evoked an enthusiastic reaction from 
the Serbian King, who replied that: 
What happiness that would be! Serbia and Bulgaria 
share a common origin, they represent one people 
with one religion and they must live in a 
brotherly way; they have the same interests and 
common enemies. A union between them would create 
a power to be reckoned with, inspiring with awe 
the Great Powers, and we would cease to be the 
play-toys of their interests. 
 
     Adding that the combined armies of Serbia and Bulgaria 
would make them “a decisive factor in the Balkans”, King 
Peter also declared that, faithful to the traditions of his 
                                                 
55 Because of the so-called “Diplomatic Strike”, Khesapchiev as Bulgarian military agent along with the 
Bulgarian diplomatic agent Konstantin Velichkov was recalled from Belgrade by the Bulgarian 
government. For the “Diplomatic Strike” See David MacKenzie, Serbs and Russians (Boulder: East 
European Monographs, 1996), 332-5. 
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Karadjordjevic dynasty, he had always hoped for a Serbian-
Bulgarian agreement “on a wide basis”.56  
     It is important to note that Khesapchiev’s suggestion 
for promoting Serbian-Bulgarian rapprochement was initially 
undertaken without authorization from either the Bulgarian 
government or the Bulgarian Monarch Prince Ferdinand. 
Khesapchiev apparently undertook this unauthorized 
diplomatic move because Bulgaria and Serbia were both on 
the diplomatic defensive caused by the threat of Austrian 
expansion in the Sanjak of Novi Pazar and Thessalonica 
respectively.57 Khesapchiev feared Austrian intervention in 
these regions because of Russia’s current military 
involvement in the Far East, which had temporarily 
distracted her from Balkan affairs.58
                                                 
56 Христофор Хесапчиев, Служба на България в чужбина, 52-3. With the last statement, King Peter 
probably meant the reign of his father, Prince Alexander (1842-59), whose Balkan policy was strongly 
influenced by Ilija Garasanin’s ideas (from his popular work Nacertanie) for creating of a large South 
Slavic State, gathering in it besides the Serbs, also the Bulgarians, the Croats and the other South Slav 
peoples: See Michael Petrovich, A History of Modern Serbia, V. II (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovic, 
1976), 231; 536. 
57 Following the provisions of Article XXV of the Treaty of Berlin the Sandjak of Novi Pazar had been 
already occupied by the forces of the Dual Monarchy: See Constantin Dumba, Memoirs of a Diplomat, 
(Boston: Little Brown, and Company, 1932), 89; what Khesapchiev meant about “the Austrian aspirations 
towards the Sandjak of Novi Pazar” was an eventual annexation of this enclave by Austria-Hungary or at 
least building of railroad there, thus these both possibilities were firmly resisted by Russia: See F. R. 
Bridge, From Sadowa to Sarajevo: The Foreign Policy of Austria-Hungary 1866-1914 (London: Routledge 
& Kegan Paul, 1972), 250-1; 256-7. 
58 Христофор Хесапчиев, Служба на България в чужбина, 51-2. According to the Russian minister of 
internal affairs Pleve the coming war between Russia and Japan was supposed to be “a little victorious war” 
for Russia: See Andrew M. Verner, The Crisis of Russian Autocracy: Nicholas II and the 1905 Revolution 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 104-5; a belief shared by the Russian Tsar Nicholas II who 
in conversation with his Foreign Minister Lamzdorf made the following comment concerning the Japanese 
army: “This is not a real army and if we have to deal with it, excuse my words, only a wet spot will remain 
of them”: See Русия начала ХХ века http://www.russiankorea.com, 4. 
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     Khesapchiev rightly supposed that Serbia’s present 
diplomatic isolation would make her receptive to an 
alliance with Bulgaria. Khesapchiev also realized that 
Bulgaria’s relations with the Ottoman Empire were at a 
dangerous point. Blaming Bulgaria for the outbreak of the 
Ilinden Revolt in Macedonia, the Porte was concentrating 
troops on the Ottoman-Bulgarian border in late 1903.59 The 
Ottoman Empire was ready to go to war with Bulgaria as a 
last resort, in order to dissuade Bulgarian encouragement 
of Macedonian Guerrilla Bands organizing in Bulgarian 
territory.60 The Bulgarian Government itself considered this 
situation so dangerous that it had sent special envoys to 
Constantinople to negotiate an agreement with the Porte in 
which Bulgaria promised her full cooperation in preventing 
the Macedonian bands from entering Ottoman territory.61  
                                                 
59 Андрей Тошев, Балканските войни, 133; Христофор Хесапчиев, Служба на България в чужбина, 
52. 
60 In fact these bands as well as their creator IMORO despite their names “Macedonian” were considered 
not only by the Ottomans, but also by the other Powers as Bulgarian, one of numerous proofs for this 
besides the already mentioned communiqué of the Russian Government from 11 April 1903 could be found 
in the memoirs of the Austrian ambassador in Belgrade from this period Constantin Dumba, where he 
refers to these bands as Bulgarian, not mentioning their designation as Macedonian at all: See Constantin 
Dumba, Memoirs of a Diplomat, 93.      
61 The Bulgarian envoys sent to Constantinople were Grigor Nachovich, a Bulgarian politician with clearly 
pro-Austrian orientation and Andrej Toshev, who at that time served as Bulgarian Commerce Agent in 
Bitolya, Macedonia, thus on 26 March (i.e. four days before signing of the secret Serbian-Bulgarian Treaty 
of Alliance) an agreement was signed between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire, which obliged the 
Bulgarian Government: 1. Not to allow formation of revolutionary comities and bands, and their 
transportation on Ottoman territory, as well as to punish everybody, who acts against law in the 
neighboring Ottoman provinces; 2. Not to allow transportation of explosive materials form Bulgarian 
territory into the neighboring Ottoman provinces: See Христофор Хесапчиев, Служба на България в 
чужбина, 52; Андрей Тошев, Балканските войни, 133-5; 151-2. 
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     Khesapchiev may have exaggerated somewhat the danger 
of war with the Ottomans. Not that the threat of war did 
not exist, but it was already receding by January 1904.62
As to Khesapchiev’s fears of Austrian expansion in 
Thessalonica and Novi Pazar,63 it is also questionable 
whether this was a real danger. Leaving aside Austria-
Hungary’s stated reluctance to make territorial 
acquisitions in the Balkans, hostilities between Russia and 
Japan had not yet begun, and in the beginning of 1904 
nobody could have contemplated so humiliating and ruinous a 
defeat for the vast Russian Empire, and the domestic 
upheavals that followed in the Revolution of 1905.64
     It is also questionable whether alliance with Serbia 
in 1904 would have enhanced Bulgaria’s security in the 
                                                 
62 Later in February, during his first meeting with Pasic in connection with the negotiations preceding the 
conclusion of the Serbian-Bulgarian Alliance of 1904, Khesapchiev, contradicting to himself, would point 
out to the Serbian Foreign Minister that Bulgaria was seeking rapprochement with Serbia, not very much 
because of the difficulty of her situation, but mostly because of Serbia’s vulnerability towards a possible 
Austrian intervention: See Христофор Хесапчиев, Служба на България в чужбина, 67. 
63 Хесапчиев, Служба на България, 51. 
64 Austrian denial for more territorial acquisitions in the Balkans was repeatedly confirmed by the public 
assurances of the Austrian Foreign Minister Goluchowski: See Constantin Dumba, Memoirs of a Diplomat, 
99; this denial was based mostly on Hungarian government’s hostility for acquisition of more Slav 
population within the Habsburg Empire, thus years 1903-05 were especially critical in the relations 
between the Imperial administration in Vienna and the Hungarian government in Budapest: See F. R. 
Bridge, From Sadowa to Sarajevo, 269-70. About the beginning of the hostilities between Russia and Japan 
in 1904 See Andrew M. Verner, The Crisis of Russian Autocracy, 104. Even after the military defeats of 
1904 and 1905 in which the Russian Empire suffered about 400 000 killed and wounded, by summer of 
1905 Russia had mustered half a million soldiers in East Asia outnumbering the already exhausted Japanese 
army and only the outbreak of the Revolution in 1905 prevented Russia from continuing and eventually 
winning the war: See David Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming War: Europe 1904-1914 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1996), 76-7. 
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event of war with the Ottoman Empire.65 Serbia at that 
moment was a country internationally isolated, politically 
unstable, and riddled with military factions, one of which 
had just overthrown and murdered the previous Serbian king. 
Serbia was also on the verge of bankruptcy.66 Under these 
circumstances well known to all Balkan observers, Bulgaria 
stood to gain very little from an alliance with Serbia. 
Indeed such an alliance was more likely to undermine 
Bulgaria’s position by damaging her relations with the Dual 
Monarchy, which considered Serbia as part of her sphere of 
influence, and thus reacted in a hostile way to every 
country trying to play politics there.    
     In short Khesapchiev’s proposal for a Serbian-
Bulgarian alliance would not necessarily have improved 
Bulgaria’s international position.67 Indeed it is likely 
that Khesapchiev’s diplomatic initiative was prompted by 
other motivations, which may be inferred from his words 
                                                 
65 In his study “The Balkan Wars 1912-1913” Richard C. Hall sees the reason for the Bulgarian interest in 
alliance with Serbia in 1904 in Bulgarian inability to wage war against the Ottoman Empire alone. 
According to Hall: “After 1903 the Bulgarians contemplated direct military action against the Ottoman 
Empire for achieving their national goals”: See Richard C. Hall, The Balkan Wars 1912-1913 (London: 
Routledge, 2000), 6; which contradicts to Serbia’s military, political and financial weakness in 1904, 
proving her incapable for serious military involvement at that particular moment. 
66 Michael Petrovich, A History of Modern Serbia, V. II, 537-41. 
67 In his memoirs “The Balkan Wars” Toshev also lists the Ottoman-Bulgarian tensions, the danger of 
Austrian invasion and the preoccupation of Russia in the Far East as reasons for Bulgaria to seek an 
alliance with Serbia in 1904, thus it is not clear was he repeating with later date these considerations from 
Khesapchiev’s article “The historical truth about the Serbian-Bulgarian Allied Treaties from 1904 and 
1905”, published in 1928 and cited in “The Balkan Wars” or the necessity for a Serbian-Bulgarian alliance 
as counterbalance to the Ottoman and Austrian threats was a consciously realized necessity for him and for 
the rest of the Bulgarian diplomats at that particular moment, given the secretive character of the Serbian-
Bulgarian negotiations that led to the treaties in question, the first suggestion looks more plausible.   
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“our brotherly peoples” which suggests more an ideological 
than a strategic consideration. 
     Khesapchiev was a Panslav for whom it was natural that 
the Orthodox Slavs should unite against their imperial 
neighbors – the Muslim Ottomans and the Catholic Austrians, 
especially, at a time when their former protector, Orthodox 
Russia, was involved in the Far East far away from the 
Balkans.68 As already noted, the difficult situation in 
which the new Serbian regime found itself also convinced 
Khesapchiev that this was the right moment to forge 
alliance between Serbia and Bulgaria. Khesapchiev was also 
a Russophile who had received his military education in St. 
Petersburg, and considered Russia as “the great helper of 
the Balkan Slav Christians”.69
     It is also important to remember that the new Serbian 
King Peter Karajorjevich was well known both for his 
Panslavism and his Russophilism, and thus he was considered 
                                                 
68 Even after the collapse of the largest Slav empire (Russia) and Bulgaria’s crushed aspirations in 
Macedonia after the Second Balkan and the First World War, Khespchiev continued to be a devoted 
Panslav up to his death in 1939, a confirmation for this could be found in the fact that he bequeathed by his 
will 100 000 leva, a substantial sum at the time, to the Bulgarian Slav Society for establishing an award in 
his name for honoring Slav writers contributing to the bringing together and the developing of the 
understanding between Slav peoples: See Елена Стателова, „Христофор Хесапчиев и неговото дело.” В 
Христофор Хесапчиев, Служба на България в чужбина: Военнодипломатически спомени 1899-1914 
г. (София: Военноиздателски комплекс Св. Георги Победоносец, 1993), 8. 
69 Хесапчиев, Служба на България, 51; 443-4. As Russophile and as Chief of Sofia Military School in 
1885 Khesapchiev was also involved in a failed conspiracy for overthrowing the Regency, which after the 
abdication of Prince Battenberg was ruling Bulgaria, resisting Russian attempts for subjecting the country, 
turning it in a Russian client state: See Симеон Радев, Строителите на Съвременна България, Том 2 
(VII. Заминаването на Каулбарса) 
http://www.slovo.bg/showwork.php3?AuID=101&WorkID=9356&Level=3
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even by the Austrians to be under the personal protection 
of the Russian Tsar.70 In his first speech from the throne, 
king Peter openly expressed his desire for “traditional 
relations with powerful brotherly Russia” and friendship 
with Serbia’s Balkan neighbors, a fact probably well known 
to Khesapchiev as the Bulgarian military agent in 
Belgrade.71 Nevertheless, king Peter was a constitutional 
monarch, and thus could play only a limited role in shaping 
Serbian foreign policy, while Khesapchiev’s action was 
unauthorized by the Bulgarian government, which in this 
period happened to be constituted by representatives of the 
People’s Liberal Party, a party with a traditionally pro-
Austrian orientation.72  
     Only when Khesapchiev returned to Sofia and described 
to Prince Ferdinand his last conversation with the Serbian 
king, did the idea of a rapprochement between Serbia and 
Bulgaria gradually gain political significance. 
Outlining Ferdinand’s role in the beginning of this 
rapprochement, Khesapchiev describes in his memoirs his 
conversation with Ferdinand:  
If Your Highness thinks that in the present 
troublesome situation, Bulgaria’s interests 
dictate an alliance with Serbia, from all points 
                                                 
70 Constantin Dumba, Memoirs of a Diplomat, 143. 
71 Michael Petrovich, A History of Modern Serbia, V. II, 537. 
72 Милен Куманов и Таня Николова, Политически партии, организации и движения в България и 
техните лидери 1878-1999 (София: Ариадна, 1999), 17. 
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of view, this is the right moment for achieving 
it. My careful study of the situation there, 
gives me all assurances that eventual 
negotiations for achieving this goal would 
succeed. Moreover since Russia began her war in 
the Far East, the Serbs are really afraid of an 
eventual offensive action by Austria-Hungary.73
   
     Prince Ferdinand replied that he had recently received 
a letter from the Prince of Montenegro, Nicola, in which 
the latter was appealing to him that “in the present 
political situation, achievement of an alliance between the 
Balkan Slav peoples is of the utmost necessity.”74
     On their second meeting, two days later, on 27 
January, Khesapchiev repeated to Ferdinand his arguments in 
favor of an alliance between Serbia and Bulgaria, adding 
that “it is possible this alliance can be achieved on the 
basis of the autonomy of Macedonia.”75
     Prince Ferdinand surprised Khesapchiev by his reply; 
seeking the maximum theatrical effect the Prince confessed 
to Khesapchiev, that many Bulgarians considered him an 
                                                 
73 In connection with the Serbian fears about such a possibility, it is interesting here to be pointed out that 
in 1913 the Austrian ambassador in Belgrade from 1903 to 1905, Dumba, admitted to the Austrian 
politician Baernreither that at that time, if wanted the Austrian Army could occupy Belgrade within 
fourteen days without facing serious resistance, Dumba even addressed a memorandum to the Austrian 
Foreign Ministry proposing Sarajevo as center of such kind of action under the leadership of Archduke 
Eugene, but he never got any answer to it, which shows how far Austria-Hungary was, even in 1903-04, 
from any kind of direct involvement in Serbia: See Joseph M. Baernreither, Fragments of a Political Diary 
(London: MacMillan and Co., 1930), 248. 
74 Христофор Хесапчиев, Служба на България в чужбина, 54. 
75 Which meant that, because of its complicated international situation, the new Serbian regime could give 
up Serbia’s firm demand for division of Macedonia. Христофор Хесапчиев, Служба на България в 
чужбина, 54.  
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“Austrian agent”, whereas, insisted Ferdinand “the 
foundation of my soul is Slavonic.”76
     This confession of the Bulgarian Prince to a Panslav 
such as Khesapchiev deserves special attention. In European 
political and aristocratic circles Ferdinand was well known 
not only for his lack of principles and firm convictions, 
but also for his histrionic and deceitful character.77 When 
it suited his personal or dynastic interests, he 
represented himself at times as founder of a new Coburg 
(supposedly pro-Austrian) dynasty in Bulgaria, other times 
as descendant of St. Louis and Louis XIV, at one moment as 
a faithful Catholic, who is eager to bring Bulgaria into 
                                                 
76 For the popularity of this accusation among some Russian and French political circles See: Христофор 
Хесапчиев, Служба на България в чужбина, 21; Serge Sazonov, Faithful Years, 49; 178; 229-30 and 
Raymond Poincare, Le Balcan en feu (Paris: Plon-Nourrit, 1926); thus especially the Russian Foreign 
Minister from 1910 to 1916 Sergei Sazonov was firmly convinced that Ferdinand “had been placed upon 
the throne of Bulgaria by the diplomatic efforts of Berlin and Vienna” for “furthering the cause of Germany 
in the Balkans”: See Serge Sazonov, Faithful Years, 49; 229-30; this accusation was also very vivid among 
the Russian, French and Serbian public opinions, but it is difficult to define how much of it was due to real 
conviction, how much simply for propaganda purposes: See Иван Илчев, България и Антантата през 
Първата световна война, 20 http://www.promacedonia.org/ii_ww1/index.html and  Христофор 
Хесапчиев, Служба на България в чужбина, 120; those who followed closely Ferdinand’s political 
course were well aware that such kind of accusations were unfounded: See Христофор Хесапчиев, 
Служба на България в чужбина, 21. 
77 Not overburdened with modesty Ferdinand described the complexity of his own personality to the French 
Ambassador in Sofia Paleologue in this way: “… some very varied atavisms are commingled in me. It is to 
the Bourbons I owe the pride of my race and my courage. But I also owe a great deal to the Coburgs: my 
kind of intelligence and my political qualities. … And if I have an ability to deal with eastern people, 
understand them, to make them accept me, then I owe it to my Magyar ancestry, to the blood I inherited 
from my grandmother Princess Kohary”: See Hans Roger Madol, Ferdinand of Bulgaria: The Dream of 
Byzantium (London: Hurst & Blackett Ltd., 1933), 94-5; but for most of the people Ferdinand had to deal 
with, this complexity, combined with his involvement in some shady financial affairs, was considered 
simply as wickedness: See Иван Илчев, България и Антантата през Първата световна война, 50-1 
and Stephen Constant, Foxy Ferdinand: Tsar of Bulgaria (New York: Franklin Watts, 1980), 181; 184-5; 
281. 
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the Catholic Church, at another moment as restless promoter 
of the cause of Germanism in Bulgaria.78
     So it is obvious that analyzing Ferdinand’s Slavophile 
confession to Khesapchiev, instead of taking it as self-
evident, one should seek to find what was its practical 
political significance and real political meaning. 
     After his reconciliation with Russia in 1896, 
Ferdinand’s “Slavophilism” was becoming more and more 
evident. During his visit to St. Petersburg in 1896 for the 
coronation of Nicholas II he not only tried to convince the 
members of the Russian Imperial family of his own Slav 
ancestry, but acted a plus Slave que les Slaves, imitating 
                                                 
78 Ferdinand’s image as an pro-Austrian Coburg was dominant for the first part of his reign (before 1895 
i.e. before his switch to a pro-Russian policy), when he enjoyed the personal support and admiration of the 
Austrian Emperor Francis Joseph: See Stephen Constant, Foxy Ferdinand, 142. St. Louis was the 
canonized King Louis IX of France who died in Northern Africa in 1270 while leading the last Crusade to 
the Holy Land, thus the stressing of this descent by Ferdinand had two fold purpose: on one hand he tried to 
show himself up as a good Catholic, on another as destined by his origin to lead the Christian Balkan 
peoples in the Last Crusade against the Ottomans for expelling them from Europe: See Stephen Constant, 
Foxy Ferdinand, 45. Ferdinand’s outlining of his Bourbon-Orleanist descent as descendant of Louis XIV 
was mainly preserved for the French politicians and diplomats, who for promoting the French interests in 
Bulgaria were often flattering the Bulgarian Prince as grandson of the last French King Louis Philippe: See 
Stephen Constant, Foxy Ferdinand, 214; 237. Ferdinand’s image as promoter of Catholicism in Bulgaria 
was dominant for the first part of his reign (more precisely before his excommunication by the Pope in 
1896) and was especially useful for him in winning the consent of Duke of Parma to marry his daughter 
Marie-Louise: See Stephen Constant, Foxy Ferdinand, 45; 140; after his excommunication Ferdinand did 
not hesitate openly to demonstrate his resentment against the Vatican, thus according to the testimony of 
Princess Victoria of Batemberg, when during the festivities accompanying the coronation of Nicholas II, 
the Catholic prelate, facing occasionally Ferdinand, marked his contempt for his apostasy with “gesture of 
spiting at him. Prince Ferdinand … spat back”: See David Duff, Hessian Tapestry (London: Muller, 1967), 
154. After his abdication in 1918, settling in his private estate in Cobug, Ferdinand gave an interview for 
the German newspaper “Berliner Tagebladt”, stating that he had worked more than thirty years in putting 
Bulgaria into “Germany’s political course”, which besides angering the Bulgarian public opinion, 
considering this as ultimate confession, was also far form real, thus the real reason for this statement could 
be found in Ferdinand’s unpopularity in Austria-Hungary at that particular moment and the unpleasant 
possibly for his expulsion within forty eight hours from its territory as it was proposed by the Austrian 
Foreign Minister at the time Count Berchtold: See Христофор Хесапчиев, Служба на България в 
чужбина, 21. 
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for instance the most pious Russians by taking off his 
headgear and crossing himself every time he passed a 
church.79 Later, in his, one could say, comic attempts to 
represent himself as a Slav prince, Ferdinand would go even 
further, ordering to be portrayed on the walls of the 
biggest church in Sofia, “St. Alexander Nevski”, in Royal 
Slavonic outfit with an inscription defining him as a 
“descendant of the Bithynian Princes”, a pure 
mystification, ridiculing him even in the eyes of his most 
faithful supporters.80
 
3. Russo-Bulgarian Secret Military Convention of 1902 
     In a political sense, Ferdinand’s pro-Russian 
orientation after 1896 reached one of its peaks in the 
secret Military Convention concluded between Bulgaria and 
Russia in 1902. 
     A detailed study of this Convention goes beyond the 
scope of this thesis, but it is important to note that the 
                                                 
79 For proving his Slav ancestry Ferdinand went back some nine hundred years to trace Slav blood in his 
mother’s family, pointing to the Dark Ages, when a Russian Princess married a Capet: See Stephen 
Constant, Foxy Ferdinand, 185; Димитър Делийски, “Ботевият ден и “византийската мечта” на 
Фердинанд,” Кула 2, (Април 2006): 3–11. Observing Ferdinand’s imitation of Russian pious behavior a 
Russian newspaper sized on this and in a satirical feuilleton mocked Ferdinand that he was taking his head 
gear off and was crossing himself even when entering Russian theaters and concert halls: See Stephen 
Constant, Foxy Ferdinand, 184-5. 
80 The Bithynian Princes were supposedly of Slavonic origin; after the Second Balkan War, when the 
Bulgarian public opinion considered Bulgaria betrayed by Russia, Ferdinand ordered the image as well as 
the inscription erased: See Добри Ганчев, Спомени за Княжеското време (София, Издателство на 
Отечествения фронт, 1983), 208; Димитър Делийски, “Ботевият ден и “византийската мечта” на 
Фердинанд”, 3–11. 
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First Article, defined the Convention as a response to the 
Military Convention concluded between Austria-Hungary and 
Rumania in 1897.81 But in several provisions (Articles Four 
and Five) the Convention exceeded its stated purpose by 
allowing Russo-Bulgarian military assistance in case of war 
against all members of the Triple Alliance.82
     As already noted this Convention was also secret, in 
part because of Article 17 of the Bulgarian Constitution, 
which allowed Bulgaria to conclude treaties only with its 
Balkan neighbors.83 But even more unconstitutional was the 
very fact of its secrecy. Article 17 also forbade the 
conclusion of treaties without the approval of the 
Bulgarian Parliament.84  
     Viewed in the light of the subsequent secret alliance 
with Serbia in 1904, the Russo-Bulgarian Convention of 1902 
is significant in yet another way. During the negotiations 
preceding its conclusion the Bulgarian Diplomatic Agent in 
                                                 
81 Даниела Давчева и Светослав Овчаров, Лисицата и Лъвът: Фердинанд I на фона на българската 
психологическа и политическа действителност 1886-1902 (София: Университетско издателство 
“Св. Климент Охридски”, 1994), 271; the full text of this Convention in English could be found in the 
Appendix, I, pp. 84-9.   
82 Including Germany and Italy respectively. 
83 The disclosure of this Convention by the Bulgarian Government came eleven years later (i.e. in 1913) 
after the disastrous for Bulgaria Second Balkan War: See Даниела Давчева и Светослав Овчаров, 
Лисицата и Лъвът, 278-85. 
84 The full text of article 17 of the Bulgarian Constitution reads as follows: “The prince represents the 
Principality in all its relations with foreign states. In his name, and with the approval of the Subranie (i.e. 
the Bulgarian Parliament), special conventions may be made with the neighboring states regarding matters 
dependent on the administration of the Principality, and for which the reciprocal action of the government 
in question is required”: See Конституция на Българското княжество, чл. 17 
http://kzg.parliament.bg/?page=history&lng=bg&hid=4 ); about the unconstitutional character of the 
Russo-Bulgarian Military Convention of 1902 See also Richard C. Hall, Bulgaria’s Road to the First World 
War (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1996), 20-1. 
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St. Petersburg, Dimitar Stanchov, reported to Ferdinand 
that in the Russian Military Minister Kuropatkin had 
strongly advised Bulgaria to conclude a similar military 
convention with Serbia, promising that Russia would support 
it.85
     Indeed, Kuropatkin’s words reflected Russia’s 
consistent policy on Serbian-Bulgarian relations in that 
period. N. V. Tcharikow, the Russian Ambassador in Belgrade 
from 1900 to 1903, notes in his memoirs that, from the very 
beginning of his ambassadorship in Belgrade, he was 
instructed to facilitate a closer possible rapprochement 
between Serbia and Bulgaria under Russia’s auspices.86
     It was thus in accordance with Russia’s political 
wishes that Ferdinand tried a rapprochement with Serbia and 
personally with King Alexander Obrenovich in late 1902.87
     This attempt ended without any significant results 
mainly because of the worsening of the internal situation 
in Serbia, due to the growing unpopularity of King 
                                                 
85 Даниела Давчева и Светослав Овчаров, Лисицата и Лъвът, 260.  
86 N. V. Tcharikow, Glimpses of High Politics, 22, where Tcharikow writes as follows: “In 1900 I was sent 
again to the Balkans as Minister Plenipotentiary to Serbia, with the same mission of furthering friendly 
relations between her and Bulgaria, based on the confidence of both in Russia.” In this quote, Tcharikow is 
referring to an 1896-7 mission, when he was Russian Ambassador to Bulgaria. 
87 Христофор Хесапчиев, Служба на България в чужбина, 38-9; witnessing as Bulgarian Military 
Agent in Belgrade Ferdinand’s attempt at a rapprochement with King Alexander in the end of 1902, 
Khesapchiev explains this policy on behalf of the Bulgarian Monarch with the coming of the Ilinden Revolt 
(more than half a year away from that particular time) and with the growing tensions between Bulgaria and 
the Ottoman Empire, threatening to evolve into armed conflict, which again contradicts to the mentioned 
above financial and military unreliability of Serbia from this period.  For Serbia’s extreme financial and 
military weakness during the last years of King Alexander’s reign See David MacKenzie, Serbs and 
Russians, 170; 305. 
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Alexander’s domestic policy as well as his marriage with 
Draga.88 To this could also be added the important detail 
that after Lamzdorf’s visit to Serbia at the end of 1902, 
Russia definitely gave up her efforts of supporting the 
unpopular Serbian King.89  
     It is also likely that Ferdinand’s conversation with 
Khesapchiev on 27 January 1904, and his odd reference to 
the “Slavonic foundation” of his soul, clearly reflects his 
desire for an alliance with the new Russophile regime in 
Serbia, and reveals Russia’s persistent attempts to 
facilitate such an alliance.  
 
4. Plans for a Bulgarian Mission to Belgrade (Late 
January 1904) 
     Soon after this conversation, Khesapchiev was summoned 
for a meeting with the Bulgarian Prime Minister and 
                                                 
88 About the extreme unpopularity of King Alexander’s marriage and his domestic policy form the last 
years of his reign See David MacKenzie, Serbs and Russians, 133-4; 303-5. 
89 N. V. Tcharikow, Glimpses of High Politics, 232-5. Russia’s policy for winning King Alexander over to 
her side mainly relied on the support that Russian diplomacy and the Russian Tsar gave to his unpopular 
marriage with Draga; this policy proved to be successful for some time, when after the death of the Ex-king 
Milan in early 1901 King Alexander refused to renew his father’s secret treaty with Austria-Hungary from 
1883, confirming in this way his new pro-Russian orientation, but Nicholas II after showing “all the 
gracious kindness” on the occasion of King Alexander’s marriage with Draga, inviting them in St. 
Petersburg, suddenly changed his policy canceling the already planed visit: Tcharikow, Glimpses, 232; 
according to Tcharikow this proved to be disastrous for the prestige of the Serbian Royal couple “among 
the Serbian people”, thus this cancellation was followed by order of the Foreign Minister Lamzdorf, who 
during his visit in Serbia in 1902 instructed the Russian Embassy in Belgrade “not to meddle with the 
internal affairs of Serbia” (i.e. stopping helping King Alexander to keep his throne); Tcharikow’s 
conclusion about Lamzdorf’s order in question is that it “was the death-warrant of King Alexander and 
Queen Draga”: See Tcharikow, Glimpses, 234; about all this and especially about Tcharikow’s role as chief 
advisor of King Alexander and the Serbian government before Lamzdorf’s visit See also Michael 
Petrovich, A History of Modern Serbia, V. II, 502-3.   
 
 46
Minister of Foreign Affairs Racho Petrov, where the 
Bulgarian Minister of Internal Affairs Dimitar Petkov was 
also present. At that meeting, he learned of his 
appointment to head the Bulgarian Diplomatic Agency in 
Belgrade.90 Dimitar Petkov also gave Khesapchiev the 
following preliminary conditions for the beginning of 
negotiations with the Serbian Government:91
1. The idea for the division of Macedonia between 
Bulgaria and Serbia is definitely excluded 
from the policy of the Bulgarian Government, 
which would adhere to the principle of 
“Macedonia for Macedonians”. 
2. The autonomy of Macedonia should be the 
leading principle in Serbian and Bulgarian 
support for the Macedonian reform program to 
be carried out by the Great Powers.92 
3. Bulgaria and Serbia are undertaking the 
obligation for sustaining peace in the Balkan 
                                                 
90 Because of the Diplomatic Strike, following the boycott of the Great Powers to the new Serbian regime, 
the Bulgarian Government was still abstaining from appointing an official Diplomatic Agent in the Serbian 
capital.    
91 The reason that Khesapchiev was receiving diplomatic instructions by the Bulgarian Internal Minister 
was due to the fact, that Dimitar Petkov was leader of the People’s Liberal Party (also called the 
Stambolovist Party after the name of its founder, the already deceased at that time Stefan Stambolov) and 
members of this party, as was mentioned above, made up the Government, predominantly. The only person 
in the Government not a member of this party was General Racho Petrov, who as a military person was not 
allowed to participate in political organizations. General Petrov was Prime Minister as well as Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, but as a political figure he was considered to be the political alter ego of Prince Ferdinand. 
92 I.e. the so-called Murtzeg program for reforms. 
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Peninsula and must therefore avoid any action 
that could cause complications in this region. 
4. Bulgaria and Serbia should agree to the status 
quo in the Balkans, and to the use of military 
force against any occupation or conquest by a 
third Power in the European lands of the 
Ottoman Empire, especially those lands 
populated by their compatriots. 
5. The Bulgarian Government is willing to open 
its Black Sea ports for transit of Serbian 
goods, taking the obligation to facilitate 
this trade with all possible means.93 
     According to Khesapchiev’s recollections at the end of 
the meeting Petkov told him that the Bulgarian Government 
“received reliable information from a friendly-to-us 
embassy in Constantinople that Turkey, encouraged by 
Germany, is preparing to declare war on Bulgaria.”94 Thus, 
as Petkov pointed out, concluding a treaty with Serbia 
would be a great accomplishment.”95
     Was Petkov really convinced that the war between 
Turkey and Bulgaria was inevitable? It is very difficult to 
say with any certainty, but given Petkov’s role as leader 
                                                 
93 Христофор Хесапчиев, Служба на България в чужбина, 56-7.  
94 War that the Ottoman Empire never declared against Bulgaria. 
95 Христофор Хесапчиев, Служба на България в чужбина, 57. 
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of the pro-Austrian People’s Liberal Party, and the 
uncompromising instructions for maintaining the autonomy of 
Macedonia, it is clear that Petkov was not simply fishing 
for an alliance with Serbia, and was clearly unwilling to 
compromise on the Macedonian question. Why, then, did he 
seek the alliance with Serbia? 
     The definite tone of Petkov’s instructions suggests 
that the Bulgarian Internal Minister was hoping to take 
advantage of the temporary weakness of the new Serbian 
regime, forcing it to accept the autonomy of Macedonia as 
basis for a future agreement with Bulgaria.96 Indeed, it is 
plausible that Ferdinand used the policy of Macedonian 
autonomy to win over Petkov (a Macedonian) to an alliance 
with the new pro-Russian Serbian Government despite the 
risk of angering Austria.97
     During the meeting with General Petrov and the 
Internal Minister Petkov, Khesapchiev was also informed 
that, the Bulgarian Diplomatic Agent in the Montenegrin 
capital, Cetine, Dimitar Rizov, would accompany him to 
Belgrade. Rizov would later also play a very important role 
in the creation of the Balkan League, and his political 
                                                 
96 Petkov was probably also hoping for some economic gains for Bulgaria form her alliance with Serbia as 
it will be shown later in the course of this thesis: See pp. 66-7; 74. 
97 Two days after the described above meeting Khesapchiev met occasionally Petkov and the latter told him 
that no other, but Ferdinand pointed out to him the favorable conditions about an alliance with Serbia at 
that particular moment: See Христофор Хесапчиев, Служба на България в чужбина, 58-9.  
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career as well as his personality thus deserve more 
detailed scrutiny.98
     Dimitar Rizov was everything that a diplomat should 
not be: he was indiscreet, tactless and was despised or 
disliked by almost everybody who had ever met him.99 
Nevertheless, he had a brilliant diplomatic career.100  
     Rizov began his political life as a Macedonian 
revolutionary, and first gained notoriety in 1885 in 
connection of the so called “coupons affair”, when 
                                                 
98 This is how one of the main architects of this alliance, the Bulgarian Prime Minister Gueshoff describes 
Rizov’s participation in the drafting of the memorandum that later would become a base for the conclusion 
of the Serbian-Bulgarian Alliance of 1912:  “After Mr. Rizoff had given us a full report of his 
conversations in Belgrade, we established the principles would should regulate our understanding with 
Serbia, embodying them in a memorandum. I may mention that the points dealing with an attack on Serbia 
and Bulgaria by a third party, particularly by Austria, were drafted by Mr. Rizoff himself”: See Ivan 
Gueshoff, The Balkan League, 13. 
99 When he got the news about Rizov’s appointment Khesapchiev pointed out to Petkov that this 
appointment jeopardized the secrecy of his mission and this soon appeared to be true, because almost 
immediately after his arrival in Belgrade Rizov began to give interviews to various newspapers that he was 
there with an important mission: See Христофор Хесапчиев, Служба на България в чужбина, 57-8; this 
indiscretion caused Prince Ferdiand’s discontent as well as the discontent of the Serbian representatives, 
thus General Gruic, warned Khesapchiev: “Rizov talks too much, he is a dangerous person”, this statement 
was supported by Pasic who remarked: “Rizov talks too much and with this he is doing harm to our cause 
and to himself. He is a person with unhealthy ambitiousness”: See Христофор Хесапчиев, Служба на 
България в чужбина, 58. Khesapchiev describes in the following way Rizov’s behavior during the 
Serbian-Bulgarian negotiations in 1904: “On the whole during the negotiations from their very beginning 
until their end Rizov behaved in an outrageous way. Almost always agitated, bristling and goggle-eyed, he 
was constantly interrupting his opponents, ending what they were trying to say by himself”: See 
Христофор Хесапчиев, Служба на България в чужбина, 97. About Dimitar Petkov’s negative attitude 
towards Rizov See Христофор Хесапчиев, Служба на България в чужбина, 57; about Khesapchiev’s 
negative attitude towards Rizov See Христофор Хесапчиев, Служба на България в чужбина, 19; 57; 97; 
435; about Ferdinand’s negative attitude towards Rizov see Христофор Хесапчиев, Служба на България 
вчужбина, 58; about the negative attitude towards Rizov of some Macedonian revolutionary leaders like 
Gorche Petrov See Вежбанка за критичко мисленье: Македонска история, 25/05: Стравот и 
желбите на македонизмат во карантин, 3, бел. 23 
http://www.makedonskaistorija.com/item/10/catid/3; one British diplomat characterized Rizov in the 
following way: “A charming person, but one should pray not meet him in a deserted place at midnight”: 
See Иван Илчев, „Сделката на Фердинанд и Радославов, с която загробиха България,” Сега, 
13.03.2002. 
100 From 1903 to 1905 Diplomatic Agent in Cetine (Montenegro), from 1905 to 1908 Diplomatic Agent in 
Belgrade, from January 1908 to September 1908 Diplomatic Agent in Athens, from 1908 to 1910 
Ambassador in Rome, from 1915 until of his death in 1918 Ambassador in Berlin: See Христофор 
Хесапчиев, Служба на България в чужбина, 649, бел. 38. 
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Macedonian revolutionaries robbed and murdered a Rumanian 
aristocrat in Bucharest. The goods robbed included 
international financial bonds, which proved dangerous to be 
cashed in Rumania, because the Rumanian police were put on 
alert after the murder.101 To get these bonds out of Rumania 
unnoticed, Rizov and his Macedonian friends used the corpse 
of the notorious Bulgarian revolutionary Rakovski, who had 
died twenty years earlier as an exile in Rumania, and was 
buried on Rumanian soil. Under the guise of transferring 
Rakovski’s mortal remains from Rumania to Bulgaria, Rizov 
and his brothers-in-arms hid the bonds in Rakovski’s casket 
and in this way smuggled them out of Rumania. This squalid 
act became public a few months later, when two Bulgarian 
military officers were arrested in Vienna trying to sell 
the bonds, but due to Russian diplomatic intervention, the 
arrested Bulgarian officers were released by the Austrian 
authorities.102     
     Rizov became extremely anti-Russian when Tsar 
Alexander III refused to recognize the newly united 
Bulgaria (1885), but Rizov soon changed his political 
affiliations, became a Russophile, and immigrated to 
Russia. In St. Petersburg, he served not only as an agent 
                                                 
101 According to the contemporary terminology the robbed financial bonds were called coupons from where 
the whole affair took its name. 
102 Симеон Радев, Строителите на съвременна България. Том I (II. Заговорът за съединението)   
http://www.slovo.bg/showwork.php3?AuID=101&WorkID=4436&Level=3
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of the Russian Asiatic Department, but was also involved in 
several unsuccessful attempts to assassinate the Bulgarian 
Prime Minister Stefan Stambolov.103
     After Stambolov’s fall from power and his murder in 
1895, Rizov returned to Bulgaria and continued his pro-
Russian activities, this time as a member of the Bulgarian 
Parliament, where he constantly lobbied for pardoning 
Bulgarian military officers who had earlier plotted to 
overthrow the anti-Russian Government in Bulgaria.104 He was 
also one of the few people in Bulgaria who publicly 
supported extremely the unpopular Russian policy of 
forcefully installing Serbian priests in Macedonia.105        
     As already noted in 1902 Rizov strongly supported a 
military alliance of all Slav Balkan states against both 
Turkey and Austria-Hungary.106 In addition Rizov was also an 
active protagonist of the South Slavonic unity in the 
broadest possible sense.107  
                                                 
103 Христофор Хесапчиев, Служба на България в чужбина, 334-6, 435. 
104 11-то Народното Събрание: I Извънредна сесия от 22.02 – 26.08.1901 г.:  Запитвания към 
Министъра на войната:  XLIII заседание, събота 5 май 1901: Запитване от Кюстендилския 
народен представител Д. Ризов за офицерите емигранти   
http://www1.parliament.bg/kns/Pkontrol/11%20ons/11%20ons.htm
105 Андрей Тошев, Балканските войни, Т. I, 122. 
106 Rizov remained Russophile and Slavophile until the Second Balkan War of 1913, when after Bulgaria’s 
humiliating defeat he changed radically into an extreme Germanophile and as such he was sent by Tsar 
Ferdinand as Bulgarian Ambassador to Berlin in 1915, where he died in 1918:  See Христофор 
Хесапчиев, Служба на България в чужбина, 436.    
107 In his memoirs the Croatian sculptor Ivan Meshtrovic, who made friends with Rizov in Rome in 1912 
relates that Rizov considered Macedonians neither Bulgarians, nor Serbians, but South Slav Christians in 
the broadest possible sense without specifying what this term exactly meant: See Вежбанка за критичко 
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     Appointing Rizov to the Bulgarian mission in Belgrade 
also meant that the coming negotiations between Bulgaria 
and Serbia would be open to Montenegro, the third Slav 
Balkan state. This tripartite configuration would later 
play a decisive role in the formation of the Balkan League 
in 1912. As Bulgarian Diplomatic Agent in Cetine, the 
Montenegrin capital, Rizov would play a role in the 
inclusion of Montenegro as prospective partner in the 
Serbia-Bulgarian Secret Treaties of 1904.108   
     But Rizov’s appointment was also important because it 
marked his emergence as one of the main players on the 
Balkan diplomatic stage; he would later play an extremely 
important role in the formation of the Balkan League in 
1912.        
     Given Rizov’s lack of diplomatic experience, it is not 
easy to explain his rise. There are, however, several 
possible explanations. First of all, there was Rizov’s 
broad Slav outlook, which made him open to pro-Serb 
concessions in order to achieve an alliance with Serbia. 
Secondly, Rizov was a former Macedonian revolutionary, and 
thus had connections and influence in IMORO, enabling him 
                                                                                                                                                 
мисленье: Македонска история, 25/05: Стравот и желбите на македонизмат во карантин, 3, бел. 
23 http://www.makedonskaistorija.com/item/10/catid/3 . 
108 See Appendix, II, 2, p. 94, Article V; how danger was this for provoking Austria-Hungary could be seen 
in the fact that Dumba writes that Austria was ready to on war for preventing Serbia and Montenegro 
unification: See Constantin Dumba, Memoirs of a Diplomat, 91-2. 
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to influence this organization in the direction of 
accepting the division of Macedonia. Finally, he was a 
Russian agent, which made him more dependable, at least in 
the eyes of the Russians.  
     In choosing Rizov, Russian agent, to negotiate the 
Balkan League later in 1911, Ferdinand was demonstrating 
his support of Russian policy.109 In any case, Khesapchiev 
and Rizov were Pan-Slavs and Russophiles, and thus fully 
committed to Russia’s aim of a Serbian-Bulgarian alliance. 
 
5. Preliminary Negotiations 
     Arriving in Belgrade in the beginning of February, 
Khesapchiev and Rizov discovered that their Serb 
counterparts also strongly favored a Serbian-Bulgarian 
alliance. During the preliminary discussions the Bulgarian 
representatives were also delighted that their Serbian 
counterparts – the Prime Minister General Sava Grujic and 
the Foreign Minister Nikola Pasic – proved very 
                                                 
109 In September 1911 Rizov returned in Sofia from Rome, where he was Bulgarian minister, and soon after 
that he was sent in Belgrade to start negotiations for Serbian-Bulgarian Alliance, which eventually resulted 
in the creation of the Balkan League: See Edward C. Thaden, Russia and the Balkan Alliance of 1912, 74; 
there are some indications in Khesapchiev’s narrative suggesting that Rizov’s appointment in 1904 as well 
as in 1911 was Ferdinand’s choice; in connection with this should be pointed out that according to the 
contemporary Macedonian historian Gligor Todorovski, Rizov was “Ferdinand Coburgotski’s man”: See 
Вежбанка за критичко мисленье: Македонска история, 25/05: Стравот и желбите на 
македонизмат во карантин, 3, бел. 23 http://www.makedonskaistorija.com/item/10/catid/3  
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conciliatory toward all conflicts, especially the most 
vexing of them, the Macedonian Question.110  
     The Bulgarian proposal for Serb agreement on the 
autonomy of Macedonia as a guiding principle of their 
policies, was whole-heartedly accepted by the Serbian 
negotiators, even the head of the Serb Parliament Aca 
Stanojevic, remarked that an autonomous Macedonia could 
become part of a future South Slav federation.111 Indeed, 
South Slav unity was a dominant theme in almost all of the 
preliminary meetings, preceding the official negotiations. 
Both Bulgarian and Serbian representatives stressed the 
promotion of the South Slav cause.112 And the need to 
counter Austrian plans against the Balkan Slavs.”113  
     In connection with this, the possibility of drawing 
Montenegro into a future alliance with Serbia and Bulgaria 
was also discussed, and thus the leading role of a Serbian-
                                                 
110 Христофор Хесапчиев, Служба на България в чужбина, 60-1; 65-6. General Sava Grujic is defined 
by Khesapchiev in his memoirs as “a good Serbian patriot and staunch Russophile”: See Христофор 
Хесапчиев, Служба на България в чужбина, 62. About Pasic’s political orientation toward Russia seen 
by him as Serbia’s natural protector and mightiest possible ally as well as about his close ties with leading 
Panslavs such as Cont N. P. Ignat’ev and M. N. Katkov See David MacKenzie, Serbs and Russians, 167-8; 
172. 
111 Христофор Хесапчиев, Служба на България в чужбина, 60. During his first meeting with 
Khesapchiev, General Grujic made a similar statement: See Христофор Хесапчиев, Служба на България 
в чужбина, 65. 
112 Хесапчиев, Служба на България, 60. In promoting Slav cause Khesapchiev even went thus far that 
speaking with Grujic pointed out that “in the new political conditions the interests of the particular Slav 
states had to be subjected to the common Panslav interests”, informing duly the Bulgarian Prime-Minister 
about this statement of his in one of his secret reports sent to Sofia: See Христофор Хесапчиев, Служба 
на България в чужбина, 65. 
113 Хесапчиев, Служба на България, 66. 
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Bulgarian agreement concerning the matter was emphasized.114 
And to ensure that Montenegro would not be left out of the 
Serbian-Bulgarian discussions, it was decided to keep the 
Montenegrin Prince Nicola personally informed about the 
ongoing negotiations.115
     Another persistent topic during the preliminary talks 
was Russia’s role in the negotiations preceding the 
projected Serbian-Bulgarian alliance. During his first 
meeting with Rizov, Pasic openly declared:  
If the Bulgarian government is really animated by 
a true desire for an agreement between our 
countries and takes the initiative for beginning 
of negotiations, I will not start negotiating 
before asking St. Petersburg for that.116
 
     In accordance with this view it was agreed to inform 
Russia of the Serbian-Bulgarian negotiations.117  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
114 Or as Stanojevic put it: “After reaching an agreement between Serbia and Bulgaria, Montenegro will fall 
by itself as a ripened fruit”: See Христофор Хесапчиев, Служба на България в чужбина, 61. 
115 Хесапчиев, Служба на България, 68. 
116 Хесапчиев, Служба на България, 61. 
117 It is interesting that Pasic, who was well connected in various Russian political circles up to the highest 
level and was familiar with different conflicting tendencies of Russian political life made in Khesapchiev’s 
presence the following comment concerning Russia’s attitude about the projected Serbian-Bulgarian 
Alliance: “I know that in Russia there is a political trend, the representatives of which have a negative 
attitude toward an agreement between Balkan Slav peoples. These fellows think that achieving this 
agreement we shall become stronger and they fear that because of that Russia’s influence in the Balkans 
would weaken, but nevertheless given to the existing political situation Russia will accept joyfully an 
agreement between us”: See Христофор Хесапчиев, Служба на България в чужбина, 67. 
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6. Official Negotiations 
     Given the conciliatory atmosphere of the preliminary 
soundings, the first meeting between the Bulgarian and 
Serbian envoys went smoothly.118
     The meeting itself took place on 7 March at 11 PM in 
Pasic’s house.119 Pasic and General Grujic represented 
Serbia while Khesapchiev and Rizov were the Bulgarian 
negotiators. 
     Opening the meeting, Khesapchiev gave a short speech. 
Predicting “a bright Slavonic future for the Balkans”, he 
ended enthusiastically with these highly spirited words: 
The successful conclusion of the great deed 
undertaken by us will be the most significant and 
most solemn political act not only in Serbia’s 
and Bulgaria’s recent history, but also in the 
recent history of the Balkans. Our brotherly 
peoples will glorify and praise this as the 
salvation of South Slavdom. 
  
     Speaking afterwards, General Grujic expressed the 
Serbian government’s gratitude about “the fortunate 
initiative” of the Bulgarian government, adding that the 
projected alliance would also include Montenegro. This 
statement evoked a positive reaction from the other 
participants who agreed that Bulgaria and Serbia should 
either conclude separate treaties with the Montenegrins, or 
                                                 
118 “Semi-official” as Khesapchiev put it: See Христофор Хесапчиев, Служба на България в чужбина, 
71.   
119 For better secrecy all meetings between Gruic, Pasic, Khesapchiev and Rizov were scheduled for late 
nightly hours. 
 
 57
else to include them in the alliance they were presently 
negotiating. 
     Speaking after Grujic, Pasic admitted that he had 
previously opposed Macedonian autonomy, but now, “pressed 
by the events” he realized that he had been wrong. He also 
expressed his conviction that the reforms undertaken by the 
Great Powers in Macedonia would not succeed and Serbia and 
Bulgaria should decide on a joint action. 
     Speaking last, Rizov agreed with Pasic, that reforms 
were doomed end concluded with his hopes for a positive 
outcome of their negotiations.   
     The Bulgarian envoys came to this first meeting with 
their proposal for a Serbian-Bulgarian alliance. 
     Read by Rizov, this project contained the following 
points: 
a) mutual defense pact against all outside aggressors. 
b) joint military action against any attempt to occupy 
the Ottoman vilayets of Salonica, Bitolya, Kossovo 
(Macedonia and Old Serbia), and Adrianople. 
c) joint support for the reforms that Russia and 
Austria-Hungary had agreed to implement in the vilayets of 
Salonica, Bitolya and Kossovo, and to promote by all 
peaceful means the introduction of these reforms in the 
vilayet of Adrianople (these reforms were aimed at autonomy 
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of the above named provinces under Christian General-
Governors, elected by the Great Powers). 
d) should the Austro-Russian reform program fail, 
Bulgaria and Serbia would jointly promote their own reform 
program for the establishment of autonomy of these 
provinces. 
e) a special military convention to accomplish the 
above tasks. 
f) duty-free importation of their respective products 
(of domestic origin), while preparing for an eventual 
customs union (Zollverein). 
g) to facilitate the mutual exchange and transit of 
their products by reducing the corresponding freight and 
passenger rates. 
h) to equalize their telegraph and postal rates and to 
introduce the Cyrillic alphabet into their telegraphic 
communication. 
i) to abolish passports, and all other hindrances to 
free communication between Serbia and Bulgaria. 
j) to conclude a judicial convention for the mutual 
execution of decisions under civil law as well as for the 
extradition of criminals according to common law (du droit 
commun), and of deserters. 
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     Other questions were to remain open for further 
negotiations.  
     In subsequent discussions, the Serbian envoys 
unanimously accepted all of these provisions and, according 
to Khesapchiev they appeared visibly relieved that the 
Bulgarian government was not exploiting Serbia’s difficult 
international situation by posing demands that Serbia could 
not accept. Pasic still hoped for the partition and 
therefore argued that the boundaries of Macedonia should be 
defined in the course of the ongoing negotiations. 
Khesapciev suspected that he would later suggest that 
Scopie be included within the boundaries of Kossovo, which 
would mean de facto partition. Pasic also told the 
Bulgarians that Serbia was ready to help Bulgaria acquire 
Constantinople, if the Ottoman Empire would to be 
partitioned.  
     But Khesapchiev realized that this proposal was an 
attempt to win Bulgarian consent for moving the boundary 
between Macedonia and Kossovo to the North of Skopje, 
simply another way of partitioning of Macedonia. Responding 
to Pasic’s ploy, Khesapchiev replied laughingly that the 
acquisition of Constantinople was not within the scope of 
Bulgaria’s foreign policy, adding that it might be possible 
for a small country to conquer this city, but impossible to 
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keep it for long.120 Pasic’s ploy is interesting in the 
light of the First Balkan War, in 1912, when Bulgaria’s 
advance on Constantinople would alarm Russia and lead her 
to allow Rumania’s attack on Bulgaria during the Second 
Balkan War, even though Russia and Bulgaria were allies.121
     As an experienced politician, Pasic was well aware 
that the Great Powers would never permit Bulgaria to 
acquire a city as important as Constantinople.  
     It is also possible that Pasic knew that the Bulgarian 
Prince (later Tsar) Ferdinand had toyed with the notion of 
becoming the successor to the Byzantine Emperors.122  
                                                 
120 Христофор Хесапчиев, Служба на България в чужбина, 75-8. 
121 Special anxiety among the highest aristocratic circles in St. Petersburg was caused by the reports of the 
Russian Ambassador in Sofia Neklydov, who reported that the Bulgarian troops were extremely 
enthusiastic about conquering Constantinople, singing brave marching songs about this; in the context of 
the traditional Russian suspicion towards the Bulgarian Tsar Ferdinand, most Russian statesmen saw him as 
main driving force behind the Bulgarian attempts for breaking into the Ottoman capital, thus one of the 
most prominent Russian aristocrats Duke Dolgorukov remarked,  that for these attempts, Ferdinand “would 
finish his career in some Russian sanatorium”: See  Георги Марков, България в Балканския съюз срещу 
Османската империя: Глава Първа: Изтръгнато надмощие, военностратегически дипломатически 
пропуски: 2. Високата порта моли за милост  http://www.promacedonia.org/gm_bw1/gm_1_5b.html; 
about Russia’s discontent concerning the Bulgarian pretensions to Constantinople and how this discontent 
affected Russia’s policy towards Bulgaria in the fateful for her 1913 See Richard C. Hall, The Balkan Wars 
1912-1913, 103. 
122 Hans Roger Madol, Ferdinand of Bulgaria, passim; Stephen Constant, Foxy Ferdinand, 180; that this 
was a well-known secret in the political circles trough Europe can be deduced from the following account 
left by the German Chancellor Bulow: during a meeting in Wiesbaden (Germany) in 1903 between the 
German Kaiser William II and Tsar Nicholas II, where Bulow was also present, the two monarchs were 
discussing the latest rumors that Prince Ferdinand was about to proclaim himself king of an independent 
Bulgaria. Nicholas II remarked: “The Bulgarian has royal ideas.” Laughing, William went on to tease 
Nicholas by asking him if he knew how the kingdom of Bulgaria would look. The Tsar replied in the 
negative and the Kaiser said: “Greater Bulgaria, including the whole of Macedonia and with its capital at 
Constantinople.” The result of this remark, Bulow wrote, was: “Tableau! The expression on his Russian 
Imperial Majesty’s face spoke volumes”: See Stephen Constant, Foxy Ferdinand, 205-6; according to the 
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov “By furthering the cause of Germany in the Balkans he 
(Ferdinand) hoped to resuscitate in his person the Constantinople basileus or at any rate to find an occasion 
for displaying the Byzantian stage outfit he had prepared beforehand. Ferdinand kept by him the regalia and 
the full dress of the Emperor of Byzantium he had brought from some theatrical company”: See Sergei 
Sazonov, Fateful Years, 229-30, n. 1.  
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     Pasic’s remark about Bulgaria’s acquiring 
Constantinople also suggests that he was well informed 
about the quixotic plans of the Bulgarian Prince, and thus 
knew that Russia feared Bulgarian ambitions in the 
Straits.123  
     Actually, Pasic’s ploy went unnoticed even by the 
other Serbian envoy General Gruic, who as “a staunch 
Russophile” reminded his colleague that Russia needed 
Constantinople, and that Bulgaria and Serbia should not 
interfere with “this centuries-old goal”.124 Pasic carefully 
replied that he recognizes the legitimacy of Russia’s goal, 
but hinted at future conflicts between Bulgaria and Russia 
over Southern Thrace.125  
     The first meeting between the Serbian and Bulgarian 
envoys on 7 March 1904 ended with a Bulgarian proposal that 
the Russian Tsar settle any disputes between Serbia and 
Bulgaria. According to Khesapchiev, the Serbian 
representatives accepted this proposal.126 It was obvious 
that Serbia supported this proposal simply because 
                                                 
123 In his memoirs (written in 1920s) Khesapchiev gives a very low estimation of Pasic’s intellectual 
abilities, explaining his political and diplomatic successes only with “his ability to make intrigues”: See 
Христофор Хесапчиев, Служба на България в чужбина, 62-4, not noticing that opposite to these 
Bulgarian diplomats, who were guided mostly by their Pan Slav affiliations, he acted as a Realpoitik 
politician: a great advantage in time when the ethics of Imperialism were predominant. 
124 Христофор Хесапчиев, Служба на България в чужбина, 78-9. 
125 Later during the First World War Russia would claim all territory south of the line Enos – Media uniting 
the Aegean with the Black Sea and only the collapse of the Tsarist regime prevented her from taking it: See 
Serge Sazonov, Fateful Years, 252. 
126 Христофор Хесапчиев, Служба на България в чужбина, 79. 
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territorial conflicts between Serbia and Russia did not 
exist.  
     On following day (8 March), the Serbian envoys 
accepted all the Bulgarian proposals, and divided them into 
two treaties – one secret and one that could be disclosed 
after a preliminary agreement between both sides.127
 
7. Negotiations Interrupted 
     Hoping for Serbian acceptance, the Bulgarians were 
surprised to learn, two days later, that Serbia would not 
sign the treaties unless the boundaries of Macedonia were 
limited to the vilayets of Salonica and Bitolya. This would 
leave Scopie and its region outside the boundaries of 
Macedonia and thus, in effect, result in Macedonia’s 
partition.128
     When the Bulgarian representatives refused to accept 
this alteration, the Serbian envoys informed them that they 
recanted their acceptance of the autonomy of Macedonia, and 
thus General Gruic openly told Khesapchiev: 
Look Mr. Khesapchiev, let’s stop outfoxing each 
other, but, rather like good friends, speak 
openly. We do not have any illusions about the 
Macedonian Question. We know very well that an 
autonomous Macedonia would become part of your 
                                                 
127 Хесапчиев, Служба на България, 79. 
128 Хесапчиев, Служба на България, 79-84. Although geographically and ethnically the Sanjak of Scopie 
was part of Macedonia, according to the existing Ottoman administrative system it was part of vilayet of 
Kossovo: See Радослав Попов, Балканската политика на България, 42, бел. 119. 
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state. In Macedonia some people speak Bulgarian, 
some Serbian, but you have been promoting your 
cause there for very long time. The Bulgarian 
Exarchate is a wonderful tool for that.129
 
     Thus, negotiations broke down over “the bright 
Slavonic future of the Balkans”.  
 
8. A Compromise Agreement 
     After another week of fruitless meetings in which both 
sides insisted on their previously declared positions, the 
Bulgarian Foreign Minister General Racho Petrov informed 
Khesapchiev that the Bulgarian government could propose a 
compromise satisfactory for both sides. He suggested a 
moratorium on the Macedonian question, thus leaving the 
Murzsteg program of reforms as the guiding principle for 
both countries in regard to Macedonia.130
     The Serbian envoys readily accepted this compromise, 
probably because Serbia saw the Murzsteg program as de 
facto sanction for the future division of Macedonia.131 The 
Murzsteg reforms envisioned the division of Macedonia into 
administrative districts based on the old Ottoman vilayet 
system. This would have left Scopje in the vilayet of 
Kossovo, where the Serbian population was predominant.132 
                                                 
129 Христофор Хесапчиев, Служба на България в чужбина, 85. 
130 Хесапчиев, Служба на България, 87-90. 
131 Хесапчиев, Служба на България, 88-9. 
132 See p. 60 of this thesis.  
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Scopje was important to the Serbs, because lay on the north 
bank of Vardar River and thus belonged to the territory 
traditionally claimed by the Serbs. 
     After some further meetings and discussions about the 
final drafts of the both treaties, on 30 March 1904 at 11PM 
Khesapchiev and Rizov for Bulgaria, and General Gruic and 
Pasic for Serbia signed them.133 As already noted, there 
were two treaties: the Treaty of Friendship, and the Treaty 
of Alliance.134  
     The content of the first went beyond the usual 
treaties of friendship, and included concrete matters like 
the common postal and telegraph rates, use of the Cyrillic 
alphabet in telegraphic communications between the two 
countries, the abolition of passport requirements between 
them, the extradition of criminals, a monetary union and 
the encouragement of mutual trade by the reduction of 
freight and passenger rates on both countries’ railways.135
     It is important to note that this Treaty was not 
specifically designated as secret, but its last article 
included a special provision allowing disclosure, but only 
after preliminary agreement between both signatories.136 
                                                 
133 Христофор Хесапчиев, Служба на България в чужбина, 99. 
134 Хесапчиев, Служба на България, 101-6; the texts of both treaties translated into English are appended 
in the end of this thesis: See Appendix, II, 1, 2, 3, pp. 89-100. 
135 See the full text of the treaty translated into English in Appendix, II, 1, pp.89-91 at the end of this thesis.    
136 Христофор Хесапчиев, Служба на България в чужбина, 102. 
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Neither Serbia nor Bulgaria wanted immediate disclosure of 
the treaty, since the first article dealt with creation of 
a future customs union.137
     This had been a Bulgarian idea, based on the fact that 
in 1904 Bulgarian economy was substantially stronger than 
the Serbian.138 Serbia, however, was also eager to free its 
economy from its total dependence on Austrian markets. The 
reason for Bulgarian reluctance to disclose the projected 
customs union was quite simple: the creation of such a 
union contradicted Article VIII of the Treaty of Berlin, 
which forbade Bulgaria to conclude commercial treaties 
without the consent of the Great Powers.139 Serbian 
reluctance to make the Treaty of Friendship public was also 
clear: she feared provoking the Dual Monarchy, which might 
have serious consequences for the Serbian economy.140   
     It is important here to point out that according to 
Kesapchiev’s recollections, during the negotiations, the 
                                                 
137 “The free importation of their respective products (of domestic origin), at the same time attempting to 
conduct similar customs policies with respect to other states, aiming at an eventual customs union 
(Zollverein)”: See Христофор Хесапчиев, Служба на България в чужбина, 101. 
138 As the pace of development years between 1903 -1909 were most forceful for Bulgarian economy 
before First World War, thus only within the period between 1904-1907 in Bulgaria the number of 
enterprises rose from 166 to 206, while Serbia began slowly to accelerate its economic development not 
before 1908 when she had only 162 enterprises, thus 1904 was for her with worst possible economic 
performance reducing her enterprises from 105 in 1903 to 93 in 1904: See Борислав Гърдев, 
„Драматичната история на банковия заем от 1901-1902” in Подир българската мечта (Варна: 
Електронно издателство “Liternet”, 2006) http://liternet.bg/publish4/bgyrdev/podir/01_05a.htm) and 
Michael Petrovich, A History of Modern Serbia, V. II, 571. 
139 F. R. Bridge, From Sadowa to Sarajevo, 278; T. E. Holland, The European Concert in the Eastern 
Question: A Collection of Treaties and other public acts (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1885), 284. 
140 Which actually happened, when at the end of 1905, the Bulgarian Parliament without asking the Serbian 
Government disclosed the projected custom union between both countries, provoking Austria-Hungary to 
wage the so-called Tariff (or Pig) War against her South Slav neighbor. 
 
 66
Serbian envoys especially warned the Bulgarian 
representatives that given Serbia’s “total economic 
dependency” upon Austria-Hungary, it would be impossible to 
establish such a customs union in the near future and thus 
“this is an ideal, which should be achieved only after a 
gradual preparation of the needed favorable conditions.”141 
The Serbian position is clearly presented in the Concluding 
Protocol accompanying the treaties.142  
     But for relations between the two countries, the 
second of the treaties was more important, since it 
represented nothing less than a political alliance.143 It 
not only expressed approval of the Murzsteg program and 
pledged the support of both states for its attainment, but 
also called for mutual military assistance against any 
attack “on the present territorial integrity and 
independence of their respective states, or on the security 
and inviolability of the reigning dynasties.” The treaty 
also called for joint action against any outside aggression 
against Macedonia and Kossovo (Old Serbia). A further 
article (Article V) envisaged a possible alliance between 
                                                 
141 Христофор Хесапчиев, Служба на България в чужбина, 156; 93. 
142 In Article I of the Chapter II of the Concluding Protocol of the treaties, titled “In order to avoid 
misinterpretations in the applications of the said treaties” reads as follows: “Concerning the Treaty of 
Friendship: (a) in Article I the phrase: “to conduct similar custom policies” is to be understood: as far as 
the existing commercial treaties of the two states permit this”: See Христофор Хесапчиев, Служба на 
България в чужбина, 105. 
143 See the full text of the treaty translated into English in Appendix, II, 2, pp. 92-5 at the end of this thesis.    
 
 67
Serbia and Montenegro concerning the Albanian Question and 
its resolution in favor of Montenegro. This article is 
especially interesting with its statement that the two 
allied countries Serbia and Bulgaria would support 
Montenegro led by a “desire to prepare the ground for the 
full cooperation between the Slavs on the Balkan Peninsula” 
and implements the idea voiced during the negotiations that 
the Serbian-Bulgarian Alliance of 1904 would be the first 
step in the creating of an alliance of all Slav Balkan 
countries.  
     The treaty also provided for arbitration by the 
Russian Tsar of any disputes between Serbia and Bulgaria, 
and also permitted the Tsar to refer such disputes to the 
Hague Tribunal. As already noted, the unanimous acceptance 
of Russian arbitration by both sides clearly reveals the 
pro-Russian character of the Serbian-Bulgarian alliance of 
1904. 
     On 31 March (after the signing of both treaties on the 
previous day) a Concluding Protocol was signed.144 It has 
been already mentioned that this Protocol stipulated that 
the proposed customs union should not affect existing 
commercial treaties, which actually meant that as it was 
contradictory to the Austrian-Serbian Treaty of 1881, the 
                                                 
144 Христофор Хесапчиев, Служба на България в чужбина, 99. 
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projected customs union could not be put in practice in the 
near future.145
     But the most important aspect of Bulgaria’s treaty 
obligations to Serbia was the inclusion in this Protocol of 
an explanatory note, specifying: “the vilayet of Kossovo is 
understood to include the Sanjak of Novi Pazar.”146  
     Inclusion of the Sanjak of Novi Pazar in Kossovo, then 
occupied by Austro-Hungarian military forces, meant that 
Bulgaria obliged herself to oppose its future annexation by 
Austria-Hungary.147 In his memoirs, Khesapchiev does not 
emphasize this very important fact, noting only that Pasic 
had made this proposal, but for a Russophile like 
Khesapchiev the opposition to Austrian claims in the Sanjak 
would have been so evident as to require no explanation.148
     In contrast to the Treaty of Friendship, the Treaty of 
Alliance in the Concluding Protocol was specifically 
designated as secret, and thus only two copies of it were 
to be kept, one by the Serbian King Peter, and one by the 
Bulgarian Prince Ferdinand.149 Again, the reason for 
Bulgarian insistence upon secrecy is clear: the Treaty of 
Alliance was contradictory to Article 17 of the Bulgarian 
                                                 
145 Michael Petrovich, A History of Modern Serbia, V. II, 549. 
146 Христофор Хесапчиев, Служба на България в чужбина, 106; Michael Petrovich, A History of 
Modern Serbia, V. II, 547; Ernst Helmreich, The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 7. 
147 Христофор Хесапчиев, Служба на България в чужбина, 103. 
148 Хесапчиев, Служба на България, 79. 
149 Хесапчиев, Служба на България, 104, 106. 
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constitution, and its disclosure would have had serious 
consequences for Bulgaria, both externally and internally. 
     Given the larger political constellation, with Russia 
engaged in a long, unsuccessful war in the Far East, the 
disclosure of this treaty could have simultaneously 
worsened Bulgaria’s relations with both the Ottoman Empire 
and Austria-Hungary. Viewed from the standpoint of 
Bulgaria’s internal politics, the disclosure of this treaty 
would have caused a split within the ruling Peoples Liberal 
Party, which ostensibly represented a pro-Austrian 
orientation. 
     The Bulgarian Prince Ferdinand also insisted that this 
treaty remain secret. Fully aware of the fact that 
disclosure of this treaty could have poisoned her relations 
with the Dual Monarchy at the worst possible moment for the 
Russian Empire, Ferdinand, who actually initiated the 
alliance in question, especially warned Khesapchiev in case 
of a possible breach of secrecy: “What are the members of 
friendly royal courts going to say about me? ‘What the Hell 
is our Ferdinand doing?’ What is my wonderful friend Great 
Duke Vladimir going to say about me?”150
                                                 
150 Хесапчиев, Служба на България, 113; Great Duke Vladimir was brother of the Russian Tsar Nicholas 
II. 
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     For different reasons, Ferdinand also feared a radical 
deterioration of his relations with the Dual Monarchy.151 
Soon after signing of the treaties, Ferdinand met 
Khesapchiev in Belgrade and told him: “If Austrians knew 
what I have done, they would have killed me immediately 
after setting foot on their soil.” To this histrionic 
declaration, Khesapchiev replied that he did it “to 
guarantee the vital interests of his [Ferdinand’s] 
Principality”.152
     The anti-Austrian character of this treaty could have 
also placed the new Serbian regime in a dangerous position 
vis-a-vis the Dual Monarchy. 
     From the standpoint of the Treaty’s value for 
Bulgaria, it is clear that Bulgarian diplomacy did not 
achieve its two major objectives: winning Serbian 
cooperation in securing Macedonian autonomy, and gaining 
economic advantages for the then-booming Bulgarian 
economy.153 Moreover, Bulgaria obliged herself to act on 
Serbia’s behalf in case of an Austrian annexation of Sanjak 
Novi Pazar, thus binding her foreign policy to that of 
Russia, Austria’s rival in the Balkans. Bulgaria also 
                                                 
151 One of the reasons could be found in fact that as Austrian-Hungarian aristocrat Ferdinand possessed 
large estates on Hungarian territory.  
152 Христофор Хесапчиев, Служба на България в чужбина, 118. 
153 As some representatives of the ruling People’s Liberal Party and some Bulgarian financiers were 
hopping for: See Хесапчиев, Служба на България, 156-60. 
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pledged support for the new pro-Russian Serbian regime. But 
the Bulgarian Prince Ferdinand viewed the subordination of 
Bulgarian foreign policy to Russian end as the sine qua non 
for survival of his dynastic regime. It is therefore not 
surprising that he steered Bulgarian foreign policy in a 
pro-Russian direction.  
     The politicians, diplomats and military men who 
conducted Bulgarian policy were both Russophiles and one, 
Rizov, was actually a Russian agent employed by the Russian 
Asiatic Department. They saw Russia as the only Great Power 
willing to help the South Slavs in achieving their 
irredentist claims.    
     For Serbia, the alliance with Bulgaria came at a 
crucial moment. The new Serbian regime had come to power 
through violence and regicide and therefore found itself 
internationally isolated. The alliance helped the new 
regime to bridge this isolation. 
 
9. The Anatomy of Russia’s Balkan Policy in 1904  
     The clearly pro-Russian character of this alliance 
also points to Russia’s direct involvement in the Serbian-
Bulgarian rapprochement of 1904, which contradicted 
Russia’s official Balkan policy from that particular 
period. Given Russia’s continued and unsuccessful 
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engagement in the Far East, official Russian policy toward 
Balkans in 1903 and 1904 strictly followed the course of 
maintaining the Austro-Russian Entente, renewed in 1902.  
     This course required Russia to cooperate with Austria-
Hungary in preserving the status quo in the Balkans while 
implementing the Murzsteg program. Russia also officially 
pressured the new Serbian regime to purge itself of the 
continuing presence of many of the regicide conspirators in 
the court of the King Peter, the new Serbian monarch.154  
     Thus Russia officially supported Dumba, the Austrian 
ambassador in Belgrade, when he initiated the so-called 
“diplomatic strike”, as well as the recall in the late 
spring of 1903 of the Russian ambassador in the Serbian 
capital, Tcharikow, who had opposed the preliminary Austro-
Russian agreement to recognize the new Serbian regime only 
de facto, while withholding de jure.155  
     Although the Russian Government did not repudiate 
Tcharikow’s action, the Russian Foreign Minister Lamzdorf 
did recall him, and made a point of especially informing 
Aehrenthal, the Austrian ambassador in St. Petersburg. This 
emphasized Russia’s commitment to Austro-Russian 
cooperation over Serbian matters.156 To strengthen the 
                                                 
154 Michael Petrovich, A History of Modern Serbia, V. II, 538-9. 
155 Constantin Dumba, Memoirs of a Diplomat, 127, 134, 212. 
156 Dumba, Memoirs, 125; 127. 
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impression of Russia’s temporary retreat from her forward 
policy in the Balkans, the Russian Foreign Ministry also 
delayed the appointment of a replacement for Tcharikow for 
almost a year, until the end of April 1904 (N.S.), when the 
new Russian Ambassador Goubastow was sent to Belgrade.157
     But leaving aside these official efforts to keep the 
Austro-Russian Entente intact, a closer examination 
focusing on the activities of the Russian embassy in 
Belgrade during this period reveals that Russia was 
actively involved in the ongoing Serbian-Bulgarian 
rapprochement. 
     Naturally, the arrival of the Bulgarian envoys in 
Belgrade, combined with Rizov’s lack of discretion, raised 
diplomatic eyebrows in the Serbian capital. Predictably, 
the most agitated were the Ottoman and the Austrian 
ambassadors.158 And while the Ottoman diplomat Fehti Pasha 
limited his rection to spreading gossip about Serbian and 
Bulgarian preparations for a final showdown between both 
countries’ forces in Macedonia, the Austrian ambassador 
Dumba was more thorough in his efforts to determine what 
was really going on between Serbia and Bulgaria.159 He thus 
                                                 
157 Dumba, Memoirs, 135; officially from July 1903 to April 1904 Tcharykow was still Russian ambassador 
in Serbia, but on leave, spent by him in Rumania until April 1905: See N. V. Tcharikow, Glimpses of High 
Politics, 237. 
158 Христофор Хесапчиев, Служба на България в чужбина, 109; 121. 
159 Хесапчиев, Служба на България в чужбина, 109. 
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met with both Pasic and Khesapchiev to find out if there 
were some truth to Rizov’s claim that he was in Belgrade 
with a “special mission” for the conclusion of a Serbian-
Bulgarian agreement.160
     Aware that their activities in Belgrade could not go 
unnoticed, the Serbian and Bulgarian envoys had agreed that 
if they were to be asked about their mission in the Serbian 
capital, they would answer that they were negotiating a 
postal and telegraph convention as well as a judicial 
one.161 The answers received by Dumba from the Serbian 
Foreign Minister and the Bulgarian envoy were consistent 
with this version, and Khesapchiev even assured the 
Austrian diplomat that because of their rivalry in 
Macedonia “any political alliance between Serbia and 
Bulgaria is unthinkable”.162   
     Khesapchiev received visits not only from Dumba, but 
also from Eckart, charge d’affairs of the German embassy, 
from Imperiali, the newly appointed Italian ambassador in 
                                                 
160 Хесапчиев, Служба на България, 109-10; about Rizov’s interviews See p. 57 of this thesis. 
161 Хесапчиев, Служба на България, 100. 
162 Хесапчиев, Служба на България, 110; given to his strong anti-Austrian sentiments, Khesapchiev is 
especially sarcastic about Dumba’s vain attempts to penetrate the Serbian-Bulgarian shroud of secrecy 
titling a whole chapter of his memoirs “Nervousness and evil devices of some foreign ambassadors in 
Belgrade”, where he describes the Austrian diplomat as “an arrogant, haughty, sly and impudent Hungarian 
magnate, first-rate intriguer and liar”, who during their meeting “with brutality typical for a German 
diplomat asked me immediately about Rizov’s special mission”: See Хесапчиев, Служба на България, 
109-11.  
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Belgrade, and from the Belgian ambassador, Van Den Steen.163 
All were trying in vain to find out what was going on 
between Bulgaria and Serbia.  
     To Khesapchiev’s amusement, all these visits were in 
pleasant contrast with the behavior of Russian diplomats 
who were calm and content during all this agitation, since 
they alone were well informed about the character of the 
negotiations, and were extremely sympathetic to a Serbian-
Bulgarian alliance.”164 Indeed, the only foreign diplomat in 
Belgrade with whom Khesapchiev was constantly in contact 
was Muravieff, secretary of the Russian embassy, who was 
then serving as charge d’affairs of the Russian diplomatic 
mission in the Serbian capital.165  
     In his regular (supposedly secret) meetings with 
Mouravieff, Khesapchiev not only kept his Russian colleague 
informed about the ongoing negotiations, and the content of 
the signed treaties, but also received an important report 
from Chekhotin, the Russian consul in the Serbian town of 
Nish.166  
                                                 
163 Хесапчиев, Служба на България, 110-11. Хесапчиев, Служба на България, 69-71; 111. Хесапчиев, 
Служба на България, 122. 
164 Хесапчиев, Служба на България, 111. 
165 N. V. Tcharikow, Glimpses of High Politics, 237. 
166 Христофор Хесапчиев, Служба на България в чужбина, 121; 135; Mouravieff’s secretive activities 
concerning the Serbian-Bulgarian rapprochement, somehow entered into Dumba’a radar, who in his 
memoirs vaguely mentions about “the intrigues carried on … by Mouravieff’: See Constantin Dumba, 
Memoirs of a Diplomat, 137; about the secret subversive activities conducted by most of the Russian 
Legation secretaries in Belgrade See Virginia Cowles, The Russian Dagger: Cold War in the Days of Tsars 
(New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1969), 223. 
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     In his report Chehotin had informed St. Petersburg 
that Serbia and Bulgaria had agreed upon the following: a) 
if the Murzsteg reforms failed the two countries would take 
in their own hands the task of improving the condition of 
their fellow-countrymen in the Ottoman Empire; and b) 
Serbia and Bulgaria would defend jointly all South Slav 
lands against any encroachment from whatever source. 
     During this meeting Mouravieff also informed 
Khesapchiev that the Russian Imperial Government was 
“extremely enthusiastic” about the ongoing Serbian-
Bulgarian rapprochement; Mouravieff also made light of 
Dumba’s agitation, saying that Dumba was trying “to hide 
his agitation, cracking stupid jokes with an inane smile”. 
From Khesapchiev’s memoirs it is also evident that 
Mouravieff had been kept well informed by the Serbian 
Foreign Minister Pasic.167  
     But following Khesapchiev’s recollections one could 
also conclude that the role of Russian diplomacy was not 
limited only to gathering information or encouraging the 
Serbian-Bulgarian rapprochement. Russian diplomats also 
played an active role in deciding how and when the Russian 
Tsar should be presented with copies of the Serbian-
Bulgarian Treaties sighed on 31 March 1904.  
                                                 
167 Христофор Хесапчиев, Служба на България в чужбина,  120-1; 135. 
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     As initiator of the Serbian-Bulgarian alliance in 
question, the Bulgarian Prince Ferdinand was pressing 
energetically for providing copies of both treaties to 
Nicholas II, while the Serbs, given their economic, 
political and geographical proximity to the Habsburg 
Empire, were more reluctant to do this.168
     Given Russia’s official policy of maintaining the 
Entente with Austria, it is also not surprising that 
Russian diplomats were reluctant to excerpt copies of the 
Treaty of Alliance, since it presented the Russian Tsar as 
supreme arbiter of an alliance directed against Austria-
Hungary.169  
     It took four and a half months, two meetings between 
Prince Ferdinand and king Peter, and the joint efforts of 
Khesapchiev, the Serbian Foreign Minister Pasic and his 
Bulgarian colleague General Petrov plus those of the 
Russian ambassadors in Belgrade and Sofia, Goubastow and 
Bahmetiev respectively, to solve this problem.170
     Finally on 15 September 1904 at 11 AM, the Russian 
ambassadors in Belgrade and Sofia were simultaneously and 
                                                 
168 Хесапчиев, Служба на България, 123. Khesapchiev relates that during their meetings Mouravieff was 
especially curious to find out, whose initiative was the new rapid Serbian-Bulgarian rapprochement, which 
according to his words was “чрезвичайно важно для истории“ [“extremely important for history” 
(Russian)], receiving from his Bulgarian interlocutor the answer that no other, but the Bulgarian Prince 
Ferdinand was the person who initiated it, Mouravieff told Khesapchiev that he would inform with a 
special letter the Russian Foreign minister Lamzdorf about this: See Христофор Хесапчиев, Служба на 
България в чужбина, 121. 
169 Хесапчиев, Служба на България, 124. 
170 Хесапчиев, Служба на България, 123-6; 130. 
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secretly presented with copies of the Treaty of Friendship 
between Serbia and Bulgaria by the Foreign Ministers of 
both countries.171  
     All these covert efforts to keep the Serbian-Bulgarian 
alliance under Russian control undoubtedly led to the 
conclusion that despite all public representation for 
keeping the status quo in the Balkans in cooperation with 
Austria-Hungary intact, Russian diplomacy was in fact 
acting in opposition to this, encouraging and supporting 
the creation of alliances between the small Balkan Slav 
states (in this case Serbia and Bulgaria), aimed eventually 
at breaking up the existing equilibrium in Eastern Europe. 
     This leads to another important conclusion: despite 
the conventional view that Russia temporarily abandoned 
Balkan politics during her ill-fated engagement in the Far 
East, the Russian Empire continued even in 1904, to 
dominate her Balkan Slav co-religionists, tirelessly 
working to unite them under Russian control, and thus 
preparing for a war against both Ottoman and Habsburg 
Empires, aimed at their final dissolution. 
 
    
                                                 
171 Хесапчиев, Служба на България, 126; this is why, when fourteen years later the Bolsheviks disclosed 
the secret archives of the Tsarist Foreign Ministry, only this treaty was found there: See p. 33 of this thesis. 
 
 79
III. CONCLUSIONS 
       
     Examining Russian policy in the Balkans in the period 
between 1896 and 1904 (i.e. before the Bosnian crisis), 
suggests the following conclusions: that Russia promoted 
alliances between the small Balkan Slav countries, 
alliances aimed not only against the Ottoman Empire, but 
also against Austria-Hungry, and although this was not done 
openly, there is evidence that Russia worked secretly to 
encourage and facilitate the creation of these alliances. 
For conducting this policy Russian diplomacy relied on 
Russophile Balkan politicians, diplomats and military men 
as well as on agents directly employed by the Russian 
Asiatic Department. Among the later was the Bulgarian 
diplomat Dimitar Rizov, who played important role not only 
in the negotiations and the conclusion of the Serbian-
Bulgarian Treaties of 1904, but also of the Serbian-
Bulgarian Treaty of Alliance of 1912, which became the 
backbone of the Balkan League. Rizov’s role in the creation 
of the above-mentioned alliances clearly points to Russia’s 
covert involvement in relentless efforts for uniting 
Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro substantially before the 
Bosnian Annexation Crisis. This Russian policy was parallel 
to, but quite different from the official one of 
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cooperation and maintaining good relations with the 
Habsburg Empire. This duality was possible only because of 
the secret diplomacy used for conducting this policy.   
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I. RUSSIAN-BULGARIAN MILITARY CONVENTION CONCLUDED ON 
31 MAY 1902 
 
1. The present convention is not aggressive in its 
aims, and as such is meant to be only a 
counterbalance to the Austrian-Romanian Military 
Convention.172 
2. From the definition of this convention as stated 
in Article 1, follows that this convention aims 
actions only against Austria-Hungary and Rumania 
and can not be used for actions neither against 
Turkey, nor against any other Balkan state. 
3. Russia would act with all forces at her disposal 
for preserving and defending the integrity and 
inviolability of the territory of Bulgaria. 
4. If Bulgaria or Russia, or the both countries 
simultaneously would be attacked by Austria-
Hungary or Rumania, or by the joint forces of 
these two states, or by the forces of the Triple 
Alliance, in this case both allied states (i.e. 
Bulgaria and Russia) take the obligation to use 
                                                 
172 The Austro-Rumanian Military Convention in question was concluded in 1898, followed by an Austro-
Rumanian treaty of alliance concluded on April 17, 1902: See Даниела Давчева и Светослав Овчаров, 
Лисицата и Лъвът: Фердинанд I на фона на българската психологическа и политическа 
действителност 1886-1902 (София: Университетско издателство “Св. Климент Охридски”, 1994), 
278; Edward C. Thaden, Russia and the Balkan Alliance of 1912 (University Park: The Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1965), 61. 
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all forces and means at their disposal to fight 
against the aggressors, not hesitating to give 
all necessary sacrifices that might be needed for 
achieving final victory. 
5. If Bulgaria were to be attacked only by Rumania, 
in this case only the Bulgarian Military Forces 
would resist this attack. Taking into account 
that Austria-Hungary had promised Rumania moral 
support and military aid, Russia (in case of 
Rumanian attack against Bulgaria) also takes the 
obligation to give Bulgaria diplomatic support, 
and if Austria-Hungary enters the war (on 
Rumanian side against Bulgaria) to enter the war 
with forces sufficient for overwhelming Austria-
Hungary. In the same way, if Austria-Hungary and 
Rumania, or the Triple Alliance without declaring 
war to Bulgaria, attack Russia, Bulgaria takes 
the obligation to mobilize all forces at her 
disposal, to concentrate them according to a 
previously drawn plan and when Russia gives order 
for that to start an offensive against the 
Austrian-Rumanian forces.  
6. In case of war between Russia and Bulgaria on one 
side and Rumania and Austria-Hungary, or the 
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Triple Alliance on the other, Bulgaria takes the 
obligation to observe strict neutrality towards 
Turkey and to be extremely cautious not to 
provoke her in order not to complicate the 
international situation. In order to execute the 
tasks related above, Bulgaria takes the 
obligation that after leaving a small amount of 
forces south of the Balkan, sufficient only for 
patrolling the borders and for keeping the law 
and order there, to concentrate all of her army 
along the Danube River for action against Rumania 
according to the preliminary elaborated plan. 
7. All plans of mobilization and concentration of 
the Bulgarian army and its units, as well as its 
plans for defense and offence, in order to 
execute the tasks and objectives given by the 
Russian General Staff, should be prepared earlier 
under the supervision of the Russian General 
Staff in collaboration with the Bulgarian 
Ministry of Military Affairs and sould be 
submitted for approval by His Imperial Majesty 
the Tsar of All Russians. The plans mentioned 
above would be reexamined, adjusted and 
supplemented if there would be a need for this. 
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8. The supreme command during the war of the Russian 
and Bulgarian armed forces as well as the command 
of the military operations, depending on whether 
the two armies would operate together or 
separated i.e. on different war theaters, in any 
case would be for the Russian Supreme Commander. 
His Highness the Bulgarian Prince keeps the 
prerogatives and the title of Supreme Commander 
of his army and would command it personally. If 
His Highness would appoint some other person for 
commanding his army, in that case this person as 
well as the Chief of the General Staff of his 
army should be appointed earlier in co-ordination 
with the Russian Ministry of Military Affairs and 
with the consent of His Imperial Majesty the Tsar 
of All Russians. 
           For facilitating the contacts between the         
  Russian Supreme Command and the Supreme Command of      
  the Bulgarian Army there would be a staff officer   
  attached to the later. There would be also one 
Russian staff officer attached respectively to   
every army corps or every particular unit of the 
Bulgarian Army. All these officers would be with 
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advisory powers for deciding questions of 
operative matter. 
 There would be one Bulgarian General or 
staff-officer attached to the Staff of the 
Russian Supreme Commander, appointed by His 
Highness the Bulgarian Prince.  
9. During the course of the military actions the 
military and transport ships of the Russian fleet 
would have access to all Bulgarians ports for 
supplying with all kind of goods and for 
organizing of the defense of these ports. All 
Bulgarian navy and all Bulgarian merchant fleet 
would go under the unconditional command of the 
Commander of the Russian navy for conducting with 
joint forces or separately all kind of 
operations, considered necessary by the commander 
of the Russian navy. 
10. The present Convention becomes valid 
immediately after its ratification and should be 
considered as a State Secret of extremely 
importance. 
(s) General Kuropatkin 
Russian Military Minister 
(s) Major-General Paprikov 
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Bulgarian Military Minister 
 31 May 1902 
(From Давчева, Даниела и Светослав Овчаров, Лисицата и 
Лъвът, 1994) 
 
II. THE SERBIAN-BULGARIAN TREATIES OF 1904 
 
1. TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE PRINCIPALITY OF 
BULGARIA AND THE KINGDOM OF SERBIA 
 
The government of His Royal Highness Prince 
Ferdinand I of Bulgaria and the government of His 
Majesty King Peter I of Serbia, deeply conscious 
of the common destinies of their neighboring and 
related states, and sincerely inspired by the 
desire of safeguarding the regulated and peaceful 
political and cultural development of their 
nations through a friendly and brotherly union 
between them, agree on the following: 
I 
To permit the free importation of their 
respective products (of domestic origin), at the 
same time attempting to conduct similar customs 
 
 88
policies with respect to other states, aiming at 
an eventual customs union (Zollverein). 
II 
To facilitate the mutual exchange and 
transit of their products by reducing the 
corresponding freight and passengers rates. 
III 
To equalize their telegraph and postal rates 
with their internal rates and to introduce the 
Cyrillic alphabet into their telegraphic 
communication. 
IV 
To abolish their frontier passports, and to 
remove all other hindrances to free communication 
between their peoples. 
V 
To conclude a judicial convention for the 
mutual execution of decisions under civil law as 
well as for the extradition of criminals 
according to common law (du droit commun), and of 
deserters. 
VI 
To conclude a monetary convention for the 
establishment of the free circulation of Serbian 
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and Bulgarian money in their states, and thus to 
facilitate commercial relations. 
VII 
This treaty may be made public only after a 
preliminary agreement between the two states. It 
shall enter into force from the day of its 
ratification. 
Concluded in Belgrade on the thirtieth of 
March 1904 (one thousand nine hundred fourth 
year) after the birth of Christ, the third day of 
the Resurrection. 
In the name of the Kingdom of Serbia: 
(s) General Sava Gruic 
(s) Nikola Pasic 
in the name of the Principality of Bulgaria: 
(s) D. Rizov 
(s) Colonel of the General Staff 
Colonel Khesapchiev. 
(By mutual consent the two allied states 
agree that this treaty be made public.) 
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2. TREATY OF ALIANCE BETWEEN THE PRINCIPALITY OF 
BULGARIA AND THE KINGDOM OF SERBIA 
The government of H. R. H. Prince Ferdinand 
Bulgaria and the government of H. M. King Peter I 
of Serbia, guided by the principle of “The 
Balkans for the Balkan nations,” and inspires by 
a desire to safeguard the peace and security of 
their peoples, to preserve the territorial staus 
quo on the Balkan peninsula, and to improve the 
condition of their fellow-countrymen in the in 
the Ottoman Empire, agree on the following: 
I 
Convinced of the utility of the program of 
reforms adopted at Murzsteg for the vilayets of 
Salonica, Bitolya and Kossovo (Macedonia and Old 
Serbia), the two allied states hereby promise to 
promote jointly and by all peaceful means at 
their disposal the execution of these reforms in 
the said three vilayets, at the same time 
encouraging their introduction into the vilayet 
of Adrianople, thus safeguarding the lives, 
property and free development of their fellow-
countrymen in these vilayets, on the basis of 
political and national equality in all respects. 
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II 
Firmly resolved to apply all of their loyal 
efforts and goodwill for the presentation of 
peace on the Balkan peninsula, the two allied 
states hereby promise jointly to defend 
themselves with all the power and resources at 
their command, against any encroachment from 
whatever source, be it on the present territorial 
unity and independence of their respective 
states, or the security and inviolability of the 
reigning dynasties. 
III 
Likewise the two allied states promise to 
oppose, with all the power and resources at their 
command, any hostile act or isolated occupation 
of the above-mentioned four vilayets, whatever 
nation may be responsible. 
IV 
In the circumstances foreseen in Articles II 
and III, the two allied states will conclude a 
special military convention, in which all 
possible eventualities and all their consequences 
will be provided for. 
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V 
In the desire to prepare the ground for the 
full cooperation between the Slavs on the Balkan 
peninsula and to create favorable circumstances 
for an immediate agreement between the Kingdom of 
Serbia and the Principality of Montenegro, the 
two allied states hereby promise – whatever the 
question of Albania should arise – to support 
such a solution as would favor the interests of 
Montenegro. 
VI 
The two allied states hereby promise to 
discuss and decide jointly all questions which, 
by their nature and spirit, are within the sphere 
of this treaty. 
VII 
The two allied states hereby promise to 
submit to the final decision of His Imperial 
Majesty the Tsar of All Russians, all of those 
controversies which they are not able to decide 
among themselves. In case the Russian emperor 
declines to award a decision on such a 
controversial question, it will be placed in the 
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hands of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at 
The Hague. 
VIII 
The present allied treaty remains secret. It 
may be communicated to a third party – in whole 
or in part – only after a preliminary agreement 
between the two allied governments. 
After five years this treaty may be brought 
up for revision if the two allied states consider 
it desirable. 
It becomes valid on the day of its 
ratification. 
Concluded in Belgrade the thirtieth day of 
the month of March, the one thousand nine hundred 
and fourth year after the birth of Christ, the 
third day of Easter. 
In the name of the Principality of Bulgaria: 
(s) D. Rizov 
(s) Colonel of the General Staff Khesapchiev 
In the name of the Kingdom of Serbia: 
(s) General Sava Gruic 
(s) Nikola Pasic 
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3. Concluding Protocol 
Today, March 31, 1904, we the undersigned: D. 
Rizov, Bulgarian diplomatic agent in Cetine, and 
Hristofor Khesapchiev, Colonel of the General 
Staff, charge d’affaires of the Bulgarian 
diplomatic agency in Belgrade, appointed by His 
Royal Highness Prince Ferdinand I of Bulgaria 
with plenipotentiary letters, issued in Plovdiv 
on March 22, as plenipotentiaries of the 
Principality of Bulgaria, and General Sava Gruic, 
president of the ministerial council, and N.P. 
Pasic, minister of foreign affairs of the Kingdom 
of Serbia, appointed by H. M. King Peter I of 
Serbia with a plenipotentiary letter, issued in 
Belgrade on March 28, as plenipotentiaries of the 
Kingdom of Serbia, with the aim of conducting 
negotiations for the drawing up and conclusion of 
a convention to guarantee the political and 
economic development of the said two states 
through joint action for protecting their 
national rights and interests, having exchanged 
our plenipotentiary letters which were found in 
good and due form, we proceeded to the execution 
of the mission entrusted to us. 
 
 95
 After a long and varied exchange of opinions 
as to the foundations which should form the basis 
of such convention, we decided: 
I 
 That the convention should consist of two 
parts: the one, which may be made public after 
the condition foreseen in its text has been 
fulfilled, to be entitled: “A Treaty of 
Friendship between the Principality of Bulgaria 
and the Kingdom of Serbia” and to contain 
agreements of a cultural and economic character; 
the other, which is secret, to be entitled: “A 
Treaty of Alliance between the principality of 
Bulgaria and the Kingdom of Serbia,” and to 
contain agreements of a political and military 
character. 
II 
 That, in order to avoid misinterpretations 
in the application of the said treaties, the 
following explanations are included in this 
protocol: 
1 
 Concerning the Treaty of Friendship: (a) in 
Article I the phrase: “to conduct similar custom 
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policies” is to be understood: as far as the 
existing commercial treaties of the two states 
permit this; and (b) as a supplement to Article 
III: the two states will agree upon making a 
joint proposal to the imperial Russian government 
for the immediate establishment of telegraphic 
communication between Russia and Bulgaria – if 
possible in the Cyrillic alphabet. 
2 
 Concerning the Treaty of alliance: (a) in 
Article I, the vilayet of Kossovo is understood 
to include the Sanjak of Novi Pazar. (b) in 
Article I, above the Serbian text of the 
Bulgarian-Serbian copy the last word pogledu, as 
synonymous with the word otnoshtayu, is not to be 
considered erroneous; (c) supplementary to 
Article I, the two allied states will promote 
mutual tolerance between their fellow-countrymen 
in the Ottoman Empire, and (d) in Article V 
“Albania” is to be understood within the 
boundaries of the vilayets of Scutari and Janina. 
III 
 That the two treaties be written parallel 
and with tow copies of each one, in the Serbian 
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and Bulgarian languages; also that the copies for 
the Kingdom of Serbia should be in Bulgarian and 
Serbian, and the copies for the Principality of 
Bulgaria should be in Serbian and Bulgarian. 
IV 
 That the original copies of the two 
treaties, duly ratified by the two sovereigns and 
their respective ministers, after the 
plenipotentiary letters and the present protocol 
have been attached, be kept in the private 
archives of H. M. King Peter I and H. R. H. 
Prince Ferdinand I of Bulgaria. Only a copy of 
the Treaty of Friendship may e deposited in the 
archives of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of 
the two states. 
 Concluded in Belgrade on March 31, the one 
thousand nine hundred and fourth year after the 
birth of Christ, the third day of Easter. 
 In the name of the Principality of Bulgaria: 
(s) D. Rizov 
(s) Colonel of the General Staff H. Hesapchiev 
 In the name of the Kingdom of Serbia: 
(s) General S. Gruic 
(s) Nikola P. Pasic 
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 (Duly ratified by the sovereigns of the two 
allied states, the above treaties were exchanged 
in Sofia on April 29th).  
(Translation C. E. Black from Ernst Helmreich, 
The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912-1913 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1938) 
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